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SUMMARY
Due to system scaling trends toward smaller transistor size, higher circuit density and
the use of near-threshold voltage (NTV) techniques, transient hardware faults introduced
by external noises, e.g., heat fluxes and particle strikes, have become a growing concern
for current and upcoming extreme-scale high-performance-computing (HPC) systems. Ap-
plications running on these systems are projected to experience transient errors more fre-
quently than ever before, which will either lead them to generate incorrect outputs without
warning users or cause them to crash. Therefore, efficient resilience techniques against
transient hardware faults are required for modern HPC applications. Meanwhile, despite
increasing threat from transient faults, fault-free operations remain the common case dur-
ing the execution of applications, thus desirable solutions call for low/no-overhead systems
that do not compromise the applications’ performance under fault-free conditions.
This dissertation is concerned with the design, implementation, and evaluation of a
light-weight resilience mechanism for large-scale scientific applications to mitigate impacts
of transient hardware faults. Under circumstances of transient hardware faults, it aims to
help scientists to assure the correct output from large-scale high performance simulations
and enable applications to continue their executions upon crashes by repairing corrupted
process states automatically and quickly as if there were no faults happened.
In particular, it consists of 3 novel techniques: 1) LADR, a light-weight anomaly-based
approach to protect scientific applications against SDCs; 2) CARE, a low-cost compiler-
assisted technique to repair the crashed process on-the-fly when a crash-causing error is
detected, such that applications can continue their executions instead of being simply ter-
minated and restarted; and 3) IterPro, which targets the problem of recovery from corrup-
tions to the induction variables by exploiting side-effects of modern compiler optimization
techniques. To limit the runtime overheads during the normal executions of applications,
these approaches exploit properties of scientific applications via compiler techniques.
xii
We comprehensively evaluated the proposed techniques with representative scientific
workloads. And the results demonstrate that, attribute to the nature design strategy of these
approaches, all of them only incur negligible (< 3%) or even zero runtime overheads during




Modern scientific discoveries rely on high performance computing (HPC) systems to run
large-scale scientific applications, such as climate modeling, physical simulations, molecu-
lar dynamics, and so on, to simulate physical phenomenons. Each run of these applications
would take a few days or months even on the world’s most powerful HPC system. For these
long-running scientific applications, reliability is one of the most important characteristics
expected from these high-end computing systems. It is unlikely to efficiently get simula-
tion results if faults are frequently encountered during the run of applications. However,
the mean time between failure (MTBF) of current peta-scale systems, which comprises
hundreds of thousands of components, is only measured in days or even hours. This is
because it is a daunting task to make sure that all components in such large-scale systems
are functional at all the times. Although the MTBF of each component is high, the ag-
gregate MTBF of the whole system is low simply because of the large number of system
components. The more components the system assembles, the lower MTBF are expected.
To mitigate these fail-stop failures, current HPC systems employ checkpoint/restart (C/R)
methods [1, 2, 3, 4] to periodically save applications’ intermediate states (checkpoints) into
a stable storage, and load the latest checkpoint to restart the computation upon a failure.
The most popular approach is application-level C/R, where programmers define the states
that need to be stored, and instrument applications with specific functions to save essential
state and restore from this state in case of failures. C/R has almost become the standard
resilience technique in modern production HPC systems.
On the other hand, to meet performance demands of these scientific applications, HPC
systems are continuously to exponentially increase the number of system CPU cores. The
coming exascale system is projected to be 1000× more powerful and complex than current
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peta-scale systems. This is achievable only when supported by the underling manufacturing
trends toward higher circuit density, shrinking transistor size and near-threshold supply
voltages. However, these factors together would unexpectedly reduce the system MTBF
and bring significant challenges to the design of resilience subsystems:
First, the C/R technique may not be suitable for scaling to such large system sizes [5].
C/R is time consuming. Each checkpoint could take as much as 15 ∼ 30 minutes due
to limited I/O bandwidth and large data volumes to be saved [3]. Coupled with the re-
quirement that lower MTBF needs higher checkpoint frequency, it implies that majority
of computing resources would be “wasted” for doing checkpoints instead of advancing
computations, if we continue to use the existing C/R techniques.
Second, transient hardware faults, which are not well considered by C/R techniques,
will become more prevalent than expected in future extreme-scale systems [5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10]. Unlike permanent hardware faults, which typically exhibit visible symptoms, transient
hardware faults occur in a non-deterministic way. Therefore, it is challenging to predict
when and where a transient hardware fault will occur. Although the error correcting codes
(ECC), such as SECDED and chipkill, could help to detect or correct these type of errors in
main memories incurring necessary cost in terms of energy and performance, there still lack
of efficient techniques against transient hardware faults manifested inside the computing
logic.
As there are significant number of studies targeting for optimizing C/R techniques [3, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] with new memory devices or software stacks, this dissertation
mainly focuses on resilience techniques against transient hardware faults, which is not well
supported by existing resilience techniques.
1.1 Transient Hardware Faults and Their Threats
Transient hardware faults are essentially caused by external noises, e.g., cosmic radiations,
heat fluxes and particle strikes. Upon occasional interactions with silicon dies, these high-
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energy neutrons are very likely to create a secondary cascade of charged particles, which
would create current pulses and change (bit-flip) values stored in the memory or produced
by computational logic. Smaller transistors are more easily to be flipped because they carry
smaller charges, thus less energy is required to flip its value [8]. While such upset events
sound to be relatively infrequent in each individual component, they are more frequent
than expect in large-scale HPC systems, simply because of the sheer number of assembled
components [15, 8]. Their failure rate is expected to increase exponentially according to
the system scale size.
Oliveira et al. [10] projected that a hypothetical exa-scale machine built with 190, 000
cutting-edge Xeon Phi processors would experience daily transient errors even though their
memory areas are protected with ECC (Error-Correcting Code) techniques. Unlike perma-
nent hardware failures, transient faults only have a temporary impact on hardware, so the
hardware can continue the normal operations when flushed with new data. Because of their
short duration, it is quite difficult to mask these non-memory faults at the hardware level
in a cost-efficient manner [16, 17]. Therefore software resilience solutions are required for
modern scientific applications running on these systems.
Depending on where they occur, transient faults mainly introduce two types of prob-
lems to modern scientific applications, including: 1). Silent Data Corruption (SDC) which
means applications can finish their executions “successfully” but with incorrect outputs,
and 2). Crashes (soft failures) which means applications are terminated unexpectedly due
to the transient faults. While the transient faults manifested inside Floating-Point Units
(FPU) are more likely to lead scientific applications to generate incorrect outputs (SDCs)
without any user-aware warnings, the transient faults that corrupt operations in Arithmetic
and Logic Units (ALU) will more likely to cause execution crashes because of the address
and branch computations performed there. Li et al. [18, 19, 20, 21] quantitatively classi-
fied these impacts on scientific applications by leveraging empirical fault injection experi-
ments. They mainly focused on transient faults manifested from the CPU logic assuming
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that memory is protected with ECC. Based on studying a set of representative scientific
applications, they pointed out that, SDC and soft failures are two major negative outcomes
of transient faults: more than 30% of transient faults were manifested as SDCs with an al-
most equivalent number of them leading to soft failures. Majority of the rest faults simply
vanished without causing any impacts to the runs of applications.
1.2 The State of the Art
Current computing systems mainly rely on hardware-level technologies to provide resilient
computing services against transient hardware faults. “safety-margin” is firstly leveraged to
increase resilience ability of transistors against external noises, e.g., high-energy particles.
“Safety-margin” is created by operating a circuit at safe supply voltages and clock rates
(e.g., higher operating voltage and lower clock rates), therefore increases the energy budget
that is required to flip bits in transistors. As a result, it would enable the hardware to operate
correctly even in the face of some variations. To counter against worst case, this design
strategy would impose expensive power and performance overheads, which is not feasible
for large scale systems. Furthermore, the modern manufacturing trends toward smaller
feature size and near-threshold voltage supplies are also breaking this design strategy due
to physical space limitations.
Beside the “safety-margin”, special radiation resilient materials are also used to insulate
transistors from external noises. However, due to high costs, manufacturing productivity
constraints and degraded performance, we only saw limited adoption of radiation-hardened
devices in mission-critical systems such as satellites, spacecrafts and so on.
In commercial computing systems, hardware-based redundancy techniques are com-
monly applied. They leverage either the replication of hardware components (e.g. triple
modular redundancy) or redundant information (e.g. error correcting code) to detect and
correct errors transparently. IBM has historically added 20%∼30% additional logic unit
for fault tolerance, and fully replicated processors’ execution units when designing S/390
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G5 [22, 23]. Such hardware redundancy approach is very expensive in terms of both hard-
ware overheads and power consumption. On the other hand, ECC [24], an information
redundancy approach, is widely adopted in current production systems to protect the main
memory subsystem. However, it has not been applied to the CPU unit, in which transient
hardware faults are projected to become significant. Intel estimated that additional correct-
ness checks on chip will increase the power consumption by 15 ∼ 20%, which is not viable
for extreme scale HPC systems due to limited power budgets.
These limitations motivated the demands of software-based techniques for future ex-
treme scale HPC systems and scientific applications. As compared to the hardware tech-
niques, software approaches are more flexible and effective. They can be easily configured
per application properties and requirements. In addition, they do not require hardware mod-
ifications, which is a good fit to HPC systems built with commercial hardware components.
1.3 Challenges for Building Software-based Resilience Solutions
Although there are many software-based approaches proposed in past years, the resilience
issue has not been addressed yet, and there are still significant challenges to be addressed
for efficient software-based resilience solutions.
1. High-level fault coverage should not compromise applications’ performance.
Despite increasing threat from transient faults, fault-free operations remain the com-
mon case during the execution of parallel applications. Therefore, it is unwise to
significantly degrade applications’ under normal circumstances when there are no
faults. However, majority of existing techniques seek to detect and correct SDCs by
duplicating computations through either executing the same copy of applications on
different sets of hardware [4, 25, 26] or duplicating the instructions of applications
via compiler techniques [27, 28]. They would require ∼2× resources overheads,
which implies that such techniques have seen limited adoption in scientific comput-
ing. Meanwhile, algorithm-based fault tolerance techniques are also emerging as
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alternatives. They focus on designing resilient data structures and algorithms. How-
ever, these algorithm-specific methods are highly specialized and as such focus on
specific computational kernels, which are normally a small part of scientific appli-
cations. Faults that happen outside the computational kernel but still affect the core
computation may be not detectable in such cases, thus would lead to low fault cover-
age.
2. There lacks of efficient methods for recovering from soft failures. While there are
a bunch of studies for detection and correction of SDCs, less research effort has been
spent on handling soft failures, perhaps because the community takes it for granted
that the standard Checkpoint/Restart (C/R) methods can provide adequate recovery.
Unfortunately, while the C/R technique can help scientific applications to recover
from soft failures, it is also very costly in terms of lost opportunities (batch job slots),
lost computation (everything since the last checkpoint) and I/O overheads (repeatedly
writing checkpoint files). These costs are particularly significant for massively par-
allel jobs [3, 5, 26] and also suffer from very poor scaling effects. LetGo [20] is
an exception which is specially designed to continue the execution of an application
upon soft failures. It relies on a set of heuristics to patch the corrupted process states.
For example, it assumes that the result of an failed instruction is 0, if the instruction
is to access an invalid memory address at low address. Obviously, such kind of tech-
nique is not to repair the corrupted states, but to convert a soft failure into a SDC,
which is another challenge problem for scientific applications.
1.4 Thesis Statement
Motivated by the above observations and challenges, this dissertation addresses the follow-
ing thesis statement:
A compiler-assisted resilience mechanism that explores properties of scientific applica-
tions is a viable way to assure the correct output from large-scale high performance simula-
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tions and continue the execution of applications by repairing crashed processes on-the-fly
with negligible overheads.
In order to demonstrate this statement, the thesis identifies the technical challenges
in designing and implementing resilience mechanisms against transient errors, develops
compiler-assisted solutions to address those challenges, applies the solutions to multiple
representative scientific workloads, and experimentally evaluates their benefits based on
empirical fault injection experiments.
1.5 Contribution
In this dissertation, we make the following major contributions.
1. We proposed LADR, a lightweight SDC detection technique for scientific applica-
tions. LADR protects scientific applications from SDCs by watching for data anoma-
lies in their state variables (those of scientific interest). It employs compile-time
data-flow analysis to minimize the number of monitored variables, thereby reduc-
ing runtime and memory overheads while maintaining a high level of fault coverage
with low false positive rates. We designed and implemented the LADR based on
the LLVM framework. It supports a majority of scientific applications written in
C/C++ and Fortran. Despite some limitations that need to be refined, our prototype
of LADR still presents one step towards building application-level SDC mitigation
frameworks.
2. We studied the manifestation of soft failures in modern scientific applications through
empirical instruction-level fault injection experiments. We classified the soft failures
based on hardware trap symptoms, and examined their manifestation latency mea-
sured in terms of number of dynamic instructions. We found that: 1). majority of soft
failures (as much as 98.95%, and 91.45% on average) evidence themselves by caus-
ing a SIGSEGV because of invalid memory access; and 2) most soft failures would
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manifest within a few dynamic instructions. Hence, the original raw data used for
array location computations remains uncontaminated, and can be used to recompute
the corrupted state. Therefore, we designed and implemented CARE, a light-weight
compiler-assisted technique to repair soft failures on-the-fly when a crash-causing er-
ror is detected, such that applications can continue their executions instead of being
simply terminated and restarted. During the compilation of applications, CARE con-
structs a recovery kernel for each crash-prone instruction, and upon an occurrence
of an error, CARE attempts to repair corrupted state of the process by executing the
constructed recovery kernel to recompute the memory reference on-the-fly.
3. We presented IterPro, which augments CARE by exploiting side effects introduced
by code optimization techniques such as strength reduction and loop unrolling, which
are widely adopted by modern compilers. While these code optimization techniques
were mainly designed to improve the execution speed, they introduce equivalent
computation patterns and values (semi-redundancies) into the code, providing op-
portunities which can be exploited for resilience purposes. IterPro leverages these
introduced semi-redundancies to repair the crashes due to corruptions in induction
variables, which are otherwise unrecoverable.
As a body of work, this dissertation demonstrates a compiler-assisted solution to build-
ing lightweight resilience mechanisms against transient errors. The solution incurs negli-
gible runtime overheads while maintaining a high-level of fault coverage.
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents an overall picture of proposed software-based resilience mecha-
nism against transient hardware faults.
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• Chapter 3 presents a lightweight SDC detection technique by exploring the data-
similarity feature and data-flow information of scientific applications.
• Chapter 4 studied manifestation of soft failures based empirical fault injection exper-
iments. The insights from this study motivated the design of a light-weight failure
recovery framework that can repair the crashed process on-the-fly with almost zero
runtime overheads, such that impacted applications can continue their executions as
normal as if there were no faults. It also exploits equivalent computation patterns
introduced by modern compiler optimization techniques for recovery from failures
caused by corruption in induction variables.
• Chapter 5 finally summarizes the dissertation, draws conclusions, and discusses open




This dissertation presents a compiler-assisted resilience framework protecting large-scale
scientific applications from transient hardware faults. The framework will help to validate
the results of the simulations to be free of SDCs and repair the process crashes caused by
transient hardware faults such that applications can continue their executions normally in-
stead of being simply terminated and restarted. Therefore, it can improve the efficiency
of modern scientific discovery processes. The proposed framework exploits applications
properties to minimize the overheads involved in detection and recovery. To achieve this
goal, the framework consists of two components, a compiler front-end for performing pro-
gram analysis and extracting applications’ properties, as well as a runtime system consum-
ing the information generated by the compiler front-end and providing resilience services.
Figure 2.1 depicts an overall picture of the framework.
The compiler front-end consists of a set of compiler passes, which perform necessary
code transformations to explicitly export code features for resilience purpose, and program
analysis to comprehensively identify, extract and convey these features to the underlying
runtime system. And the runtime system of the proposed framework is presented as a set
of shared libraries, which will be linked to applications and provide resilience services for
SDC detection and soft failure recovery as guided by the information generated by the
compiler component.
Based on the functionality of each component, the framework can be further divided
into two separate and independent sub-modules. In particular, libProtector.so and
Analyzer form a sub-module named LADR, which provides functionality of SDC detec-
tion; libSafeguard.so and Armor formed another sub-model called CARE that is to
provide the recovery service against soft failures. These two sub-modules work indepen-
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Figure 2.1: Overview of the Compiler-Assisted Resilience Framework against Transient
Hardware Faults
dently.
For SDC detection, the application is compiled with the Aanlyzer pass, which per-
forms the program analysis to build the data-flow graph among state variables (arrays)
of scientific applications. Based on the data-flow graph, a small subset of state variables
(indicated by the Targets in Figure 2.1) can be identified such that SDCs in other vari-
ables are finally propagated to this subset of variables. The libProtector.so library
implements an interface, which is called inside the code to monitor the value changes in
the selected state variables. It detects SDCs by monitoring value change patterns of each
data points in monitored state variables. This detection strategy is motivated by the ob-
servation that scientific applications exhibit data-similarities across time steps. Different
data similarity algorithms are implemented in our prototype. To further reduce the runtime
overhead, libProtector.so divides the data points for each monitored state variable
into several groups, with each group containing a few data points. For each group, a feature
value, e.g., a representative mean, standard deviation, or mass is extracted, which forms a
new and much smaller feature array. The framework thus works on the feature instead of
original data points for SDC detection, which significantly reduces the number monitored
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data points, therefore reduces the runtime overhead. The libProtector.so employs
an algorithm to dynamically divide data points into groups based on features of the data to
improve the detection efficiency. Currently, when a SDC is detected by LADR, the pro-
cess is terminated, and the checkpoint/recovery mechanism is activated rolling back the
application to a saved error-free state.
On the other hand, for soft failure recovery, Armor and libSafeguard.so are
involved. Armor itself consists of 3 independent compiler passes. These passes work
in a predefined order to perform necessary code transformations and program analysis
to build a set of recovery kernels for failure-prone instructions. It then compiles these
recovery kernels into a standalone shared library (represented as kernels.so in Fig-
ure 2.1). Armor constructs recovery kernels by strategically cloning related instructions
from original source codes, and each recovery kernel is represented as a function in a
similar way to the C language. Upon a failure detected by operating system, a method
in libSfeguard.so is automatically activated to diagnose the failure, disassemble the
failed instruction and find the (potentially) corrupted architecture state, load the recovery
kernels library (kernels.so), search for the appropriate recovery kernel, and execute it
to get a new memory access address. If the new address is the same as the current accessed
address, the recovery has failed and the process is terminated. Otherwise, it will repair the
related architecture state with a value derived from the new address, and the process will




In this chapter, we present LADR, a lightweight SDC detection technique for scientific ap-
plications. It shares a similar detection model to techniques introduced in [29, 30] in that
they all detect SDCs by watching for data anomalies in state variables of scientific applica-
tions. Built on top of this philosophy, LADR employs compile-time data-flow analysis to
minimize the number of monitored variables, thereby reducing runtime and memory over-
heads while maintaining a high level of fault coverage with low false positive rates. On
the evaluated benchmarks, LADR achieved > 80% fault coverage with only∼ 3% runtime
overheads and∼ 1% memory overheads. We believe that such an approach with low mem-
ory and runtime overheads coupled with attractive detection precision is a viable approach
for assuring the correct output from large-scale high performance simulations
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 1, SDC is one of major negative impact of transient hardware
faults for scientific applications, and it has attracted intense attentions. Complete and com-
prehensive SDC detection requires the duplication of computing through either hardware
or software redundancy [25, 4, 31], but the overheads required (∼2× resources), and the
fact that fault-free operations remain the common case despite the increasing transient fault
threat [32], mean that such techniques have seen limited adoption in scientific computing.
Fortunately, many scientific applications can tolerate some errors in their outputs [33, 10],
as long as the errors don’t introduce new data features. This allows the HPC commu-
nity to trade-off fault coverage for the performance, and has motivated the development
of anomaly-based detection methods [34, 35, 30]. These methods seek to exploit charac-
teristics implicit in many scientific applications, such as those which iteratively simulate
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changes in physical properties, in order to determine when a calculated value has fallen
outside its ‘expected’ range based upon either prior or neighboring values. It is worth to
note that while applying such techniques to all data in an application would be impractical,
it is viable to limit its use to only “variables of scientific interest” [30] (e.g., variables that
are actually output for further analysis, or that are used in checkpoint/restart. We’ll call
them the ‘crucial variables’.) with relatively low overheads. However, many scientific ap-
plications i.e., Parallel Ocean Program (POP), have dozens of crucial variables, and even
when these techniques are limited to that set of data, overhead imposed are still significant,
perhaps too high for the techniques to gain acceptance by the scientific community.
LADR is therefore designed to reduce these overheads by exploring correlations among
crucial variables and data points. LADR shares a similar detection model to that in [30, 29].
It is built upon those prior works by introducing compiler techniques to detect and utilize
the data-flow of the application in order to limit monitoring overhead. LADR reduces the
overheads primarily through minimizing the number of monitored variables. For a given set
of crucial variablesC, LADR monitors a smaller set of variablesD, such that if variables in
C are contaminated by SDCs, variables in D will also be contaminated; or put differently,
SDCs will be definitely propagated fromC toD. We name variables inD as sink variables
of C. LADR finds D mainly leveraging compile-time data-flow analysis. The similar idea
was also presented in [29], but without reference to compile-time analysis. In addition, for
each variable in D, LADR also applies a data grouping technique to further reduce runtime
and memory overheads, which is not explored in prior studies [30, 29]. LADR is designed
to detect SDCs in crucial variables. SDCs in control variables are not covered unless they
are propagated as corruptions to crucial variables.
In this chapter, we mainly made the following contributions:
1. we proposed a methodology to minimize runtime and memory overheads for anomaly-
based SDC detection techniques.
2. we designed and implemented the LADR based on the LLVM framework, and sup-
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ports a majority of scientific applications written in C/C++ and Fortran. Despite
some limitations that need to be refined, our prototype of LADR still presents one
step towards building application-level SDC mitigation frameworks.
3. We evaluated LADR with 4 representative scientific workloads including GTC-P,
POP, LAMMPs and miniMD. We find that LADR is able to protect them from
influential SDCs with as low as ∼ 1% memory overheads, and ∼ 3% runtime
overheads. As compared to the state-of-the-art anomaly-based detection technique,
LADR achieved comparable faulty coverage, but reduced runtime overheads by more
than 20% and memory overheads by up to 55%.
The evaluation results suggest that LADR is a promising solution for scientific applica-
tions that can tolerate small numerical fluctuations in their outputs. Certainly, LADR has
its constraints for some applications or in some operational situations in which the accu-
racy of results is the users’ primary concern. We believe, however, LADR is attractive in
many situations since many scientific simulations themselves are approximate computing
to physical phenomenons and can tolerate some small errors [33, 36, 37] in their output.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 introduces relevant back-
grounds and observations that motivated this work; section 3.3 depicts the overall design
of LADR; section 3.4 presents the design details of LADR for identifying sink variables;
section 3.5 describes the runtime design of LADR; section 3.6 and section 3.7 respectively
present the prototype and evaluation results. Next, related works are discussed in sec-
tion 3.8, followed by conclusion in section 3.9.
3.2 Background and Motivation
LADR is built on top of the state-of-the-art data-anomaly SDC detection methods. It aims
to optimize these methods by exploiting applications’ properties. Therefore, in this section,
I will first present the philosophy of the data-anomaly SDC detection; and then present the
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observation that motivated the design of LADR.
3.2.1 Anomaly-based Techniques
Anomaly-based detection methods mainly exploit the characteristics of the application data
to detect SDCs. Yim et al. [38] computed the histogram of application data to detect outliers
in conjunction with temporal and spatial similarity. Di et al. [30] characterized features of
applications’ outputs, and exploited the smoothness of their outputs across time dimension
for detecting SDCs.
These techniques generally have three phases: 1) predicting the next expected value
in the time series for each data point; and 2) determining a bound, e.g. normal value
interval, surrounding the predicted value. 3) detecting possible SDCs by observing whether
the observed value falls outside the bound. There are 4 possible situations as depicted
in Figure 3.1. Obviously, as compared with complete computational redundancy, these
methods trade off fault coverage for performance. They could miss SDCs if the selected
bound ρ (shown in Figure 3.1(a)) or the prediction error ε (shown in Figure 3.1(b)) is larger
than the impact of SDCs. On the other hand, it would incur false positives if ρ is smaller
than ε. A case depicting a successful detection is shown in Figure 3.1(d).
As mentioned before, our work shares a core similarity to that of Di et al. [30] with re-
spect to the basic approach of detecting SDCs through analysis of predicted values, and
Berrocal et al. [29] introduces the concept of exploiting correlation between variables.
LADR extends these prior work by proposing compiler techniques to exploit dataflow-
based variable correlation, and in exploring point grouping strategy for additional overhead
reduction.
3.2.2 Propagation of SDCs
Although by no means universal, time-step based iterative solvers are an important com-




































Figure 3.1: Detection model of anomaly-based techniques (figure derived from [30])
the real world. These applications simulate real-world phenomena by solving a system of
differential equations on points (e.g., grids, particles). Each point could be associated with
several states (i.e., speed, temperature, energy etc.), which are crucial variables of applica-
tions. Applications proceed along the temporal dimension to update states for each point.
The result of each time-step will be taken as the input to the next time-step. Climate models
are typical examples. They treat the atmosphere as a cubic box divided into grids, and each
grid represents a geometrical area on the earth. Climate parameters, e.g., temperature, are
computed by solving atmosphere dynamic equations for each grid. To update a specific
state for a grid, the values of other states of other grids would be used. Due to this nature,
these applications present two general characteristics that inspired the design of LADR.
First, SDCs propagate among crucial variables during the iterative updates. For ex-
ample, Table 3.1 shows that, for GTC-P and POP, the contamination of multiple crucial
variables could result from a single fault injected into a data element of crucial variable
listed in the first column. Therefore, it is possible to detect SDCs by only monitoring a
subset of crucial variables. For GTC-P, specifically, it is possible to protect the variables
z0 , z1 , z2 , z3 , z4 , and z5 by only monitoring the variable moments .1 In observing this,
LADR shares a similarity with [29], which also notes that error correlation between vari-
ables can be exploited to reduce SDC monitoring overhead, but does not specially propose
1Each of these variables store attributes of particles, e.g., weight and velocity. The names are as they
appear in GTC-P source code.
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Table 3.1: Correlation among crucial variables. It is based on controlled fault injection
experiments. Faults are injected to variables in the first column and then the outputs of
other variables are checked against the output of fault-free run. Each run of the application
performs one injection to one variable.
(a) GTC-P Particle Data Variables
injected
impacted
z0 z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 moments
z0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
z1 3 3 3 3 3 7 3
z2 7 7 3 7 3 7 3
z3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
z4 7 7 7 7 3 7 3
z5 3 7 7 3 3 3 3
(b) POP TAVG Output Variables
injected
impacted
SALT SALT2 TEMP UVEL VVEL
FW 7 3 3 3 3
Gradpy 7 7 3 3 3
RHO 7 7 3 3 3
TFW 7 7 3 7 3
STF 7 7 3 7 3
SMF 7 7 7 7 3
a method for establishing this correlation. The variables to be monitored must be carefully
selected such that SDCs which occur in unmonitored variables will be captured. LADR
leverages data flow analysis to identify these variables since the data-flow among crucial
variables imply potential SDC propagation path.
Second, multiple data points of each contaminated crucial variable might be impacted
by a single SDC, as shown in Figure 3.2. This inspired us to group data points to further
reduce the overheads. As shown in our evaluation, the grouping could also improve the pre-
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Figure 3.2: Average number of contaminated data points within 5 time-steps after a fault
injection.
diction accuracy for the predictor in Phase I, therefore, making the detector more sensitive
to SDCs.
3.3 Overview of LADR
LADR is a lightweight application-level SDC detector for iterative scientific applications.
It consists of two components: 1) Analyzer–a static compile-time analysis tool for identi-
fying sink variables for a given set of crucial variables; and 2) Protector–a runtime library
for conducting anomaly detection. Figure 3.3 depicts the process of utilizing LADR to pro-
tect scientific applications. First, given the crucial variables set, the Analyzer is used to
determine their sink variables. The Analyzer identifies sink variables by building a data-
flow graph, which depicts potential SDC propagation paths among all crucial variables.
The data-flow graph is a directed graph with each node representing a crucial variable,
each edge representing a potential propagation direction between two connected crucial
variables, and the weight on each edge representing relative execution orders of the state-
ment defining the propagation. Figure 3.4 gives an example of data-flow graph among 5
variables (f is an alias to e) for the code listed in Figure 3.5. Afterward, original source
files are modified to apply Protector on identified sink variables. Protector is inserted at




























Figure 3.4: Data-flow graph for the example code in Figure 3.5
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1 #include <stdio.h>
2 void add(double x[], double y[], double z[], int size)
3 {
4 for (int i = 0; i < size; i++)
5 z[i] = x[i] + y[i];
6 }
7
8 void mul(double x[], double y[], int factor, int size)
9 {
10 for (int i = 0; i < size; i++)
11 y[i] = x[i] * factor;
12 }
13
14 int main(int argc, char **argv)
15 {
16 double *a, *b, *c, *d, *e, *f, sum = 0;
17 int i, size;
18 a = (double *)malloc(size * 8);
19 ...
20
21 add(a, b, c, size);
22 for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
23 sum += c[i];
24 sum = sqrt(sum);
25 mul(b, d, sum, size);
26 f = e;
27 add(c, d, f, size);
28 add(f, d, d, size);
29 output(a,b,c,d,e);
30 }
Figure 3.5: Example code
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3.4 Analyzer: Building Data-flow Graph for Identifying Sink Variables
The Analyzer extracts potential SDC propagation paths by leveraging static data-flow
analysis based on the observation that SDCs would propagate from one variable – saying
b, to another – saying a, only if the calculation for a directly or indirectly uses the value
of b. Analyzer focuses on the main computation codes – the main loop – of scientific
applications. For simplicity, the Analyzer used the following observations for scientific
applications:
1. Crucial variables of these applications are life-time-long arrays (a memory space).
At the program level, they are either defined as global arrays or allocated during the
initialization phase of the applications but not deallocated until the end of execution.
2. Parallelization techniques (MPI and OpenMP) have no/limited impact on data-flows
among crucial variables, because each process/thread conducts the same computation
but on a different portion of data.2 Hence, Analyzer ignores all MPI functions calls
and OpenMP primitives.
3. Crucial variables are updated inside loops, and related loop bodies will not be skipped
because of false initial loop conditions.
Analyzer works on LLVM IR code, a light-weight and low-level intermediate represen-
tation of programs. This makes LADR relatively independent of programming languages
utilized by scientific applications, and it can support a majority of existing scientific ap-
plications (if not all) that are normally written in either C/C++ or Fortran. In LLVM IR
code, each memory access is explicitly issued through either a load instruction (LoadInst)
2There are two principal questions WRT how MPI and OpenMP might impact LADR: 1) do they add
additional dependencies for the Analyzer to track, and 2) how they impact SDC propagation. We find that for
the scientific simulations we have studied, which are largely spacially decomposed, communication abstrac-
tions don’t add dependencies between state variables that are not already present in the code. Second, while
it is possible for SDCs to be communicated between processes, they will generally be picked up wherever
they cause a significant disruption to expectations since the protector is embodied in every MPI rank. So
these primitives get no special handling in LADR.
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1 %2 = load i32* %i, align 4
2 %idxprom = sext i32 %2 to i64
3 %3 = load double** %x.addr, align 8
4 %arrayidx = getelementptr double* %3, i64 %idxprom
5 %4 = load double* %arrayidx,align 8
6 %5 = load i32* %i, align 4
7 %idxprom1 = sext i32 %5 to i64
8 %6 = load double** %y.addr, align 8
9 %arrayidx2 = getelementptr double* %6, i64 %idxprom1
10 %7 = load double* %arrayidx2,align 8
11 %add = fadd double %4, %7
12 %8 = load i32* %i, align 4
13 %idxprom3 = sext i32 %8 to i64
14 %9 = load double** %z.addr, align 8
15 %arrayidx4 = getelementptr double* %9, i64 %idxprom3
16 store double %add, double* %arrayidx4, align 8
Figure 3.6: LLVM IR Code for the loop of add
to read data from a memory location, or a store instruction (StoreInst) to update a mem-
ory location. Therefore, each assignment operation in source codes would correspond to
several LoadInst instructions to read data for RHS operands, a set of related computation
instructions, and one StoreInst instruction to update the memory with final result, as shown
in Figure 3.6.
3.4.1 Extracting Data-flow among Variables
Based on the above observation, Analyzer extracts data-flow among crucial variables by an-
alyzing StoreInst instructions, which have two operands named as source and destination,
simply assuming that the array in destination (write to) covers arrays involved in source.
For each operand of StoreInst, LADR leverages def-use chain to backwardly extract in-
volved variables through looking for LoadInst. Based on the type of operands, there are 5
possible situations:
1. the source operand is a pointer, as shown in line 23 in Figure 3.5. In this case,
Analyzer considers the destination operand as an alias to the source operand, and
23
maintains an pointer-to-pointer aliasing map for the ongoing analyzed function for
future reference.
2. the source operand is an array element and the destination variable is a scalar
variable, as shown in line 20 in Figure 3.5. In this situation, Analyzer will maintain
a scalar map for the ongoing analyzed function to temporary record propagation path
information among scalar variables and arrays for future reference, since it could
define an indirect propagation among crucial variables.
3. the source operand is a scalar variable and the destination variable is an array
element, as shown in line 9 (factor ) in Figure 3.5. For this case, Analyzer will first
check the scalar map using the source operand. If there exists an entry, it will retrieve
related source arrays from the scalar map, and record the propagation information
between the destination and each source array into propagation map.
4. both source and destination operands are scalar variables, as shown in line 13
in Figure 3.5. This is similar to the case in item 3. LADR will first check whether the
source operand has an entry in the scalar map; if yes, it will register the destination
operand into the map with the same content. Otherwise Analyzer will simply skip
the instruction.
5. both source and destination operands are array elements, as shown in line 4 in
Figure 3.5. This case defines a direct propagation among crucial variables. The
Analyzer will simply register the propagation information in the propagation map
(aliasing map would be checked to retrieve the actual variables before the actual
registration).
3.4.2 Function Calls
To build the data-flow graph for whole application, LADR needs to handle function calls.
For each CallInst, Analyzer takes following actions depending on the type of the callee
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function:
1. memory allocations, e.g., malloc/alloc. For each memory allocation, Analyzer as-
signs an id internally to virtually represent the allocated memory region and registers
it in global variable tables.
2. basic math computation, e.g., sqrt andmax. For these functions, Analyzer extracts
data-flow information among their arguments and return values leveraging knowl-
edge of library APIs.
3. application defined functions. For these functions, Analyzer will dive into func-
tion bodies to analyze each StoreInst, essentially inlining the subroutine to handle
parameters and return values.
3.4.3 Conditional Control/Data Flow
Generally, Analyzer takes a conservative approach to conditional or run-time determined
control and data flow, e.g. evaluating both paths in an if expression and taking the superset
of those contributions as the overall data flow. This is most effectively done by simply
ignoring the branch operators in the LLVM IR code.
Overall. To elaborate Analyzer clearly, we take the example code in Figure 3.5 to
illustrate the entire analyzing process. Analyzer starts analysis in the main function. It con-
siders all malloc statements as defining variables. For the first add function call statement
(line 18), it inlines add by aliasing x to a, y to b, z to c, and s to size. All references to x,
y, z and s are replaced with a, b, c, size, so we will get propagation paths among c, a and b
instead of z, x and y. For line 20, we will get sum covers c. Since sum is scalar, it will be
registered in scalar map. In line 21, since sqrt is a standard mathematical function, we can
easily get that sum covers itself. Then for mul function call, it will do the inline procedure
as did to add in above. In line 4, we will get propagation paths among d, b and sum. Since
sum is now in scalar map with a propagation path from c, we will update the entry for d in
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the propagation map with an edge from c. The above procedures will be repeated for the
following function calls.
3.5 Protector: Anomaly-Based SDC Detection
LADR Protector shares a similar detection approach to extant anomaly-based detection
methods [30, 29]. However, it distinguishes itself in two aspects: 1) it groups data points
for each monitored variable, and works on the feature array constructed by extracting a
data feature from each group. 2) it detects SDCs with two metrics from the perspectives of
the number of contaminated data points and error magnitudes. LADR currently supports
three data features for grouping, including mean, standard deviation, and entropy, as well
as three predictors: Linear Curve Fit (LF), Quadratic Curve Fit (QF) (from [30]), and Au-
toRegression (AR). LADR seeks to select the best predictor, feature, and grouping strategy
based on a learning window, such as the first few time steps of a run assuming there are no
SDCs in these steps.
3.5.1 Data Points Grouping
Crucial variables of scientific applications are typically huge arrays with millions or even
billions of data points, therefore, it would still incur non-negligible runtime and memory
overheads with current point-wise predictions, since they need to preserve the history data
and predict the value for each data point at each time-step. LADR proposes to mitigate
this issue by grouping data points, which is motivated by the observation that a single SDC
could contaminate multiple data points (see section 3.2). Intuitively, data points grouping
could increase the potential of diluting SDCs if the group size is too large, therefore re-
ducing fault coverage. Based on the intuition that the global/regional state could be more
stable and predictable than the point-wise state (as shown in Figure 3.7), LADR employs a
heuristic-based grouping algorithm to achieve a balance between fault coverage and result-
ing overheads. In this heuristic-based grouping algorithm, the predictability for each data
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Figure 3.7: Predictability (measured with pacf) of a point and the group (constructed with
8-neighbor points) in which the point resides. The mean value of the group is used.
point(Cp) and the global array (Cg) are first calculated with partial correlation function
(pacf), and data points are now roughly divided into two groups based their predictability:
1) points whose Cp are larger than Cg; and 2) points whose Cp are less than Cg. For points
whose Cp are larger than Cg, they are simply divided into groups with minimum group size,
which is a user-specified parameter (we set it as 8 in our experiments). For points whose Cp
are smaller thanCg, they are merged with their neighbors recursively until the predictability
of the group is around Cg or group size is larger than a user-specified maximal group size.
For each group, the feature leading to higher predictability is selected as representative of
the group. In addition, domain-specific knowledge can be leveraged for grouping too. For
example, in MD codes, the velocity information (V) of each atom is encoded with three data
points, representing velocities in the x, y, and z directions. Thus, a grouping strategy that
calculating the absolute velocity (
√
x2 + y2 + z2) can be applied, which could reduce the
overhead by 3×. Such domain-specific grouping can replace the default heuristic-grouping
algorithm or be applied together with the heuristic grouping algorithm.
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3.5.2 SDC Detection
As in [30], LADR detects SDCs by checking the value of monitored variables at the end of
each time-step. It works on prediction errors calculated with Eq. Equation 3.1 (below) for
each data point, where P is prediction value, O is observation value and i refers to a data
point. Since we have no knowledge about the correctness of observation value, historic
mean values of data points are used in our estimates.
E(i) = (P (i)−O(i))/mean(hist(i)) (3.1)
Afterward, for each data point, the prediction error range, [mean(E(i)−θ×std(E(i)),
mean(E(i) + θ × std(E(i))], is constructed based on its history prediction errors. θ is
initialized with a constant value (we set it to 8 in our experiments), and is updated at






, if γ < 0.5 ∗ θ
1.5γ, if γ > θ
(3.2)
If the prediction error of a specific data point is out of its range, an SDC is assumed for the
point. It is, however, too strict to use the result of a single point to indicate the existence of
SDCs, and would incur significant false positives due to prediction variance. To mitigate
this issue, LADR detects SDCs based on two metrics. First, for each time-step, we calculate
the ratio of data points with out-of-bound prediction errors. An SDC is reported only when
the ratio is larger than a threshold. Currently, the threshold was derived statistically from
the learning window. During the learning phase for selecting best predictor, feature and
grouping strategy, the out-of-bound ratio R for each time step was also recorded. And the
threshold was set as mean(R) + 5 ∗ std(R), or 0.08% in our experiments. This metric is
designed based on our second observation, and it is to detect SDCs that could contaminate a
large number of data points. Secondly, LADR also checks the statistics (mean and standard
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deviation) of prediction errors (error magnitudes across all data points) for each time-step.
In normal cases, we observe that these statistics are within small bounds, which can be
constructed based on the historic data using the same method for constructing prediction
error bounds. If a statistic associated with the current step is out of the normal bound, an
SDC is reported also. This metric could help to detect SDCs causing significant errors but
affecting too few data points. The recovery procedure will be invoked if an SDC is reported
by either one of these two metrics.3
3.6 Prototype
We implemented LADR with two separate components: a LLVM-based compiler-framework—
Analyzer, and a runtime protector library—GE. In particular we implemented Anlyzer as
an independent LLVM pass (∼ 1688 LOC) based on LLVM-3.5.2. It analyzes unmodified
source code of an application to build data-flow graph among crucial variables. We lever-
age Clang or DragonEgg to compile C/C++ or Fortran codes into LLVM IR codes (.ll file).
Our current prototype of Anlyzer only generates the data-flow graph, and the sink variables
are manually/visually selected by simply picking destination node in the generated graph,
e.g., d in Figure 3.4. We hope to fully automate the entire process in future work.
The GE runtime is developed based on GSL library. Similar to [30], it exposes users
5 API routines as shown in Figure 3.8. GE init is inserted to the beginning of the appli-
cation right after MPI Init. GE Protect is inserted before the main loop for each protected
sink variable. Each sink variable can be assigned with separate parameters according their
data features. GE Snapshot is inserted at the end of main loop, right before output rou-
tine. Finally, GE PrintResult and GE Finalize are expected to be inserted right before
MPI Finalize.
3This paper doesn’t propose new recovery methods, and we assume checkpoint/restart can be used here.
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1 GE_Init(MPI_COMM);
2 GE_Protect(char varname, void *var, int data_type, ←↩





Figure 3.8: GE Protector API
3.7 Evaluation
We evaluated LADR through fault-injection experiments. In this section, we will first
introduce the evaluation methodology, and then present evaluation results.
3.7.1 Evaluation Methodology
We evaluated LADR on a cluster with 32 nodes. Each node is equipped with a 12-core
Intel(R) Xeon(R) X5660 (2.80GHz) CPU, 24GB of memory and Mellanox Technologies
MT26438 InfiniBand card. Similar to the work in [30], we focused on unexpected data
changes (SDCs) caused by transient faults, e.g., bit-flips of the data. We simulated SDCs
through application-level fault injections as did in study [19]. We implemented a simple
fault injection tool based on GDB’s MI interface for this purpose. For sake of easy analysis,
the tool injects faults to one MPI rank during each run of applications. In this tool, a fault
is identified by a tuple with 4 elements (iteration, execution point, target, fault):
• iteration and execution point together determine when the fault will be injected.
• Execution point is represented in form of file:line.
• target determines where the fault will be injected. It is a specific memory location of
applications.
• fault determines how to corrupt the value of the target. Random bit-flips are used in
our evaluation.
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We injected faults directly into applications’ memory space since it behaves closer to
SDCs. We performed one injection per run, and contaminated one data point per injection.
∼6000 injections in total were performed. We compared LADR to the “Reference” scheme,
in which all of crucial variables in our setups were monitored and point-wise predictor
was employed. In contrast, LADR only monitored the identified sink variables (shown
in Table 3.4) and also applied the data point grouping technique. For the “Reference”
scheme, the tool developed in [30] was used. We compared them from 3 aspects:
1. fault coverage (FC). It measures how many SDCs are detected by an SDC detector.
It is defined by number of detected SDCs over the total injections that contaminated
values of crucial variables.
2. false positive (FP). A FP happens when an SDC is mistakenly reported for a fault-
free time-step. It is defined as the number of mistakenly reported time-steps over the
total number of iterations under the evaluation.
3. overhead. It contains runtime overhead incurred by predictions, and memory over-
heads incurred for storing history data sets.
3.7.2 Evaluated Workloads and Baselines
We evaluated LADR with the four scientific workloads in Table 3.2. In our evaluation,
we set up the baselines for GTC-P and POP with 6 crucial variables, and for miniMD
and LAMMPS with 3 crucial variables. The data size of each crucial variable is shown
in Table 3.3. LADR’s Analyzer identified 1 sink variable for each evaluated workload, as
shown in Table 3.4. After sink variables were determined, application codes were modified
to monitor the variable using the GE library. The modification effort involved 25 lines of
code changes for GTC-P, miniMD and LAMMPS, as well as 45 lines of code changes for
POP, which was minor and acceptable.
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Table 3.2: Evaluated scientific workloads





C program. A 2D domain decomposition version of
the GTC global gyrokinetic PIC code for studying
micro-turbulent core transport. It solves the global,









Fortran program. A 3D ocean circulation model de-
signed primarily for studying the ocean climate sys-
tem. It was used to perform high resolution global
ocean simulations to resolve meso-scale eddies that





LAMMPS C++ program. a classical molecular dynamics code,
and an acronym for Large-scale Atomic/Molecular





MiniMD C++ program. A simple, parallel molecular dynamics




Table 3.3: Per time-step size of evaluated variables
GTC-P POP miniMD LAMMPS
name size name size name size name size
zion0 25280 KB TEMP 5750 KB V 16384 KB V 16384 KB
zion1 25280 KB SALT 5750 KB F 16384 KB F 16384 KB
zion2 25280 KB SALT2 5750 KB X 16384 KB X 16384 KB
zion3 25280 KB UVEL 5750 KB – – – –
zion4 25280 KB VVEL 5750 KB – – – –
zion5 25280 KB RHO 5750 KB – – – –
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Table 3.4: Analyzer cost
Apps Source code (LOC) LLVM IR (LOC) Sink variables Analysis time
GTC-P 18,453 61,049 moments(1775KB) 3 mins.
miniMD 4,167 28,028 V(16384 KB) 2 mins.
LAMMPS 415,084 1,655,405 V(16384 KB) 18 mins.
POP 59,678 478,311 TRACER(575KB) 189 mins.
3.7.3 LADR Analyzer Cost
As shown in Table 3.4, Analyzer worked more efficiently on GTC-P, miniMD and LAMMPS
than on POP. It roughly took 2 ∼ 3 minutes for analyzing GTC-P and miniMD, ∼ 18 min-
utes for analyzing LAMMPS, but nearly 3 hours for POP. We attribute this issue to two
reasons: 1) a larger code base for POP (around 3× of GTC-P and 10× of miniMD), and 2)
inefficient IR code generation for Fortran. During our evaluation, We found that the IR code
generated from the Fortran program was not as succinct as the IR generated from C/C++.
It introduced significantly more branches and virtual functions, which are not shown in the
original source code. These features, especially branches, complicate the analysis of Ana-
lyzer because it needs to evaluate each potential execution path. With the ongoing project
FLANG, a native Fortran front-end for the LLVM framework, we expect this issue would
be mitigated.
3.7.4 Fault Coverage
Fault coverage is a major metric for measuring the effectiveness of SDC detectors. While
LADR aims to optimize the runtime and memory overheads, it should not significantly
sacrifice fault coverage.
Figure 3.9 compares the fault coverage of LADR to the “Reference” scheme for the
evaluated workloads. Results of using different grouping strategies are also reported.
“LADR-grouping(H)” shows grouping data points leveraging the proposed heuristic group-
ing algorithm, “LADR-grouping(S)” divided data points evenly using the same number of
























Figure 3.9: Fault coverage comparison. H – Heuristic grouping; S – Static grouping
itoring of the sink variable. As shown in the figure, “LADR” achieved comparable fault
coverage as compared to the “Reference” scheme, reducing overhead by monitoring fewer
variables at a cost of just a 1% ∼ 4% decrease in fault coverage. Meanwhile, the heuristic
grouping algorithm boosts its performance significantly, since it improved the predictabil-
ity of the feature data, therefore allowing a more accurate detection model. As an example,
Figure 3.10 presents the impact of our heuristic grouping algorithm on the predictability for
miniMD. It shows that, the heuristic grouping algorithm effectively removes the data points
with less predictability (comparing Figure 3.10(a) and Figure 3.10(b)), but didn’t blindly
increase the group size Figure 3.10(c). As shown in Figure 3.1(b), low predictability would
lead to lower fault coverage since a large bound was required for tolerating false positives.
These results suggest that, by leveraging data-flow information, it’s unnecessary to moni-
tor all crucial variables to protect scientific applications from SDCs, and heuristic grouping
algorithm can achieve a better balance between group size and prediction accuracy than
static grouping.
3.7.5 Runtime and Memory Overheads
In this section, we evaluated the overheads of LADR. We compared it to the “Reference”
scheme and to baseline runs in which no protection is applied to the workloads. Figure 3.11




(c) group size distribution
Figure 3.10: Impacts of heuristic grouping. The constructed feature data is more pre-
dictable among time-steps. Most groups have a few data points, while static grouping has
245 points for each group. Due to limited space, only the data for miniMD is plotted. Other






























































































Figure 3.11: Runtime and memory overheads of LADR with sink variable (S) and data points
grouping (G)
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toring sink variables, LADR reduced runtime overheads by 21% for GTC-P, 25% for POP,
22% for miniMD and 57% for LAMMPS. It also reduced memory overheads for them re-
spectively by 38% for GTC-P, 39% for POP, 24% for miniMD and 28% for LAMMPS. This
is mainly because it monitored fewer variables. For GTC-P and POP, it is also because the
selected sink variable is smaller than the crucial variables. In addition, the grouping algo-
rithm divided GTC-P into 5230 groups, POP into 3270 groups, miniMD into 4289 groups,
and LAMMPS into 10367 groups for data points in each node. This further reduced mem-
ory overheads to around 1% for these workloads and runtime overheads to 2.96% for GTC-
P, 1.22% for POP, and 9.16% for miniMD, and 11.8% for LAMMPS. These results show
that monitoring sink variables can significantly reduce overheads of anomaly-based SDC
detectors, and data points grouping can further reduce the overheads to a negligible level.
In conclusion, the evaluation results show that LADR significantly reduced runtime and
memory overheads as compared with prior methods without sacrificing fault coverage. It
would be a promising method for scientific applications that can tolerate some numerical
disturbance while being protected from larger SDCs in the majority of their data.
3.8 Related Work
In addition to aforementioned data-anomaly based approaches, current researches against
SDCs mainly fall into two categories: 1). computing replication and 2). algorithm-based
fault tolerance (ABFT).
First, computing replication performs SDC detection and correction by either dupli-
cating (critical) instructions of applications via the compiler technique [28, 39, 27, 40]
or replicating the execution of the same copy of application on different sets of comput-
ing nodes [4, 26, 25]. Thus multiple instances of the computation (instruction or process)
can be compared and divergences are taken to be evidence of an SDC. EDDI [27] and
SWIFT [28] are two important representatives for instruction-level redundancy. EDDI du-
plicated all instructions and inserted “checking” instructions right before storing a register
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value back to memory or determining the branch direction. SWIFT optimized overheads
of EDDI through an enhanced control flow mechanism. Regarding to the application-level
redundancy, RedMPI [25] ran a shadow process for each MPI rank and redesigned MPI
communication system to duplicate message passing for both shadow process and princi-
ple process. SDCs were detected through comparing messages between replicas. ACR [4]
replicated processes on different nodes and detected SDCs by comparing check-pointing
data from each replica.
On the other hand, ABFT techniques [41, 42, 43, 44] mainly focus on designing re-
silient data structures and algorithms for processing matrix. Chen et al. [41] examined the
block row data partitioning scheme for sparse matrices, which were then utilized to recover
critical data without checkpoint. Du et al. [42] constructed a column/row checksum matrix
for matrix computations, such that SDCs can be detected by scanning partial product ma-
trix and recovered with the checksum matrix. These algorithm-specific methods are highly
specialized and as such focus on specific computational kernels, which are normally a small
part of scientific applications.
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented and evaluated LADR, a lightweight tool to help validating a
given simulation run to be free of SDCs. In the absence of such validation, the integrity of
high fidelity simulations remains questionable on very large scale systems that are prone to
such errors. An effective solution must achieve high fault coverage with limited overheads.
To this end, LADR is built on top of state-of-the-art data-anomaly detection techniques,
and extended them with program analysis to minimizing runtime and memory overheads.
In particular, it exploits the correlation among state variables and data points, such that it
can detect SDCs by only monitoring the data in a small portion of process’s memory. We
evaluated LADR using application-level fault injection experiments. Results suggest that
LADR can protect application from influential SDCs with no more than 8% overheads. For
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two of evaluated workloads, it only incurs around 2% overheads. LADR demonstrates that
it is unnecessary to apply anomaly detection techniques on all crucial variables. Instead, a
subset of crucial variables can be identified employing compile-time data-flow analysis.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPILER-ASSISTED RECOVERY FROM SOFT FAILURES
This chapter presents a light-weight compiler-assisted recovery framework for soft failures.
The framework aims to repair the (crashed) process on-the-fly when a crash-causing error
is detected, such that applications can continue their executions instead of being simply ter-
minated and restarted. The framework consists of a compiler component, which performs
necessary code transforms and construct a recovery kernel for each crash-prone instruction
during the compilation of applications, and a runtime system which attempts to repair cor-
rupted state of the process upon an occurrence of an error by searching and executing the
constructed recovery kernel to recompute the corrupted architectural state on-the-fly for the
impacted process. The framework also exploits side effects introduced by code optimiza-
tion techniques such as strength reduction and loop unrolling, which are widely adopted by
modern compilers, to improve its fault coverage against transient hardware faults.
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 1, for scientific applications, soft failure is one of two major out-
comes of transient hardware faults. However, while there has been significant amount of
prior work on detecting and correcting SDCs [41, 43, 37], less research effort has gone
into handling soft failures, perhaps because the community takes it for granted that the
standard Checkpoint/Restart (C/R) methods in current resilience mechanisms can provide
adequate recovery. Unfortunately, while the C/R technique does have the capability to re-
cover from soft failures, it is very costly in terms of lost opportunities (batch job slots), lost
computation (everything since the last checkpoint) and I/O overheads (repeatedly writing
checkpoint files). These costs are particularly significant for massively parallel jobs [3, 5,
45]. Reliance on C/R means that a job which suffers a transient hardware fault will be killed
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and must be resubmitted, having to wait in the job queue before it can continue execution.
Once running, the job must first load the saved state from a checkpoint, which would in-
volve slow I/O operations and then redo calculation that was lost before it can get to the
point where the failure occurred. However, since transient faults only impact the hardware
temporarily, i.e., for a few cycles, more advanced techniques might mask the fault at the
application level, allowing the application to continue the normal operations when their
corrupted state is repaired, therefore improve the system utilization efficiency and speedup
the process of modern scientific discoveries.
In this chapter, we argue that, while the C/R is still necessary in many circumstances
(e.g., power failures, job termination, etc.), soft failures can often be handled with a light-
weight resiliency mechanism, which could help to mitigate the overall overheads of the re-
silience mechanism in HPC systems. Specifically, we propose CARE (Compiler-Assisted
REcovery), a lightweight and compiler-assisted framework to recover processes of scien-
tific applications from soft failures on-the-fly. The framework is designed for targeting
errors emanating from computing logic units, assuming that memory areas are protected
with ECC. Upon a failure, the framework will attempt to diagnose and repair the corrupted
state for the failing process on-the-fly through replaying related computations, such that
scientific applications can continue their executions instead of being simply terminated.
CARE is inspired by two insights we observed from scientific applications and our
study about the manifestation of soft failures (See section 4.2 and section 4.3):
1. The majority of soft failures would manifest via hardware traps. Specially, as much
as 98.95% (91.45% on average) of soft failures evidence themselves by causing a
SIGSEGV because of invalid memory access. This is because many scientific ap-
plications contain features like stencil codes, or otherwise involve complex address
computations to access neighbor values.
2. Most soft failures would manifest within a few dynamic instructions. Hence, the
original raw data used for array location computations remains uncontaminated, and
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1 // memory access statement
2 phitmp[(mzeta + 1) * k] = mzeta * k;
3
4 // the recovery kernel
5 uint64_t recovery_kernel(int *phitmp, int mzeta, int k)←↩
{
6 return (uint64_t)(phitmp + ( mzeta + 1 ) * k);
7 }
Figure 4.1: A sample recovery kernel.
can be used to recompute the corrupted state.
Based on the above insights and the predominance of soft failures manifesting as in-
valid memory accesses, the approach employed by CARE builds a set of recovery kernels,
one per memory access instruction, that can recompute appropriate addresses for failed
dereferences at runtime.
A recovery kernel simply consists of a standard function which mirrors the address
calculation operations of a portion of the application. An example of recovery kernel is
shown in Figure 4.1. This kernel computes the address for phitmp[(mzeta + 1) ∗ k], tak-
ing phitmp, mzeta and k as parameters. Upon a SIGSEGV failure raised when accessing
phitmp[(mzeta+1)∗k], CARE’s runtime system will fetch values of phitmp, mzeta and
k from the address space of the process, and execute the kernel to recompute the address.
CARE can successfully get the correct address if phitmp, mzeta and k are unmodified
by the fault. Otherwise, CARE will get a invalid address as issued by the failed instruc-
tion and will terminate the process. To this end, a challenge for CARE is corruptions in
loop induction variables, which are commonly involved in address computations for ar-
ray element accesses and are partial of parameters of recovery kernels. Once their values
are corrupted by transient hardware faults, it could significantly reduce the recovery rate
of the framework for applications. To improve its recovery capability in cases when loop
(derived-)induction variables are corrupted by the fault, CARE will exploit side effects in-
troduced by code optimization techniques such as strength reduction and loop unrolling,
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which are widely adopted by modern compilers, to repair these corruptions. While these
code optimization techniques were mainly designed to improve the execution speed, they
introduce equivalent computation patterns and values (semi-redundancies) into the code,
providing opportunities which can be exploited for recovery of corrupted induction vari-
ables. However, these semi-redundancies are typically not explicitly present. To this end,
CARE introduces two extra code transformations to reshape the code without introduc-
ing significant performance penalties, such that the introduced semi-redundancies can be
explicitly exposed to the underlying recovery method.
In summary, this chapter makes the following contributions:
• We propose a new failure recovery framework for scientific applications to survive
soft failures. It exploits hardware detection of memory access violations to repair
crashed architecture states on-the-fly by replaying computations that are extracted
from applications. It is lightweight. Except requiring some offline code analysis
effort for building recovery kernels, it incurs almost zero runtime overhead and fixed
27MB memory overheads during the normal execution of applications.
• To motivate the design of the new framework, we studied the manifestation of soft
failures in modern scientific applications through empirical instruction-level fault in-
jection experiments. We classified the soft failures based on hardware trap symptoms,
and examined their manifestation latency measured in terms of number of dynamic
instructions. The results of this empirical study motivated the design of the new
framework.
• We described how to exploit the properties of modern code optimization techniques,
coupled with two extra code transformations, for building a lightweight (if not zero-
overhead) failure recovery method. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work to examine how code optimization techniques can contribute to lightweight
resilience mechanisms.
43
• We designed and implemented the proposed strategy based on the LLVM frame-
work and the Linux system. While more engineering work is needed to support -
O2/-O3 optimizations, our prototype demonstrates a solid step towards a lightweight
resilience mechanism for soft failures.
• We evaluated the proposed framework with 4 scientific workloads and with up to
3072 cores. The results show that, on average, it can recover about 84% of soft
failures for the evaluated workloads within dozens of milliseconds, allowing paral-
lel applications to finish their jobs with almost no delays even when crash-causing
errors happen during their execution. We also present preliminary evaluation results
for BLAS, showing that the proposed method can support for failure recoveries in
libraries with a high coverage rate and negligible performance hit.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 studies and presents how
soft failures are manifested from transient faults, which motivated the design of CARE;
section 4.3 explains why CARE is important for many scientific applications, and the
challenges it needs to address; section 4.4 briefly introduces code optimization techniques
exploited by CARE; section 4.5 depicts the overall picture of the system; section 4.6,
section 4.7 and section 4.8 respectively present design details about the front-end and the
runtime of CARE; section 4.9 presents the prototype details; Next, evaluation results are
presented in section 4.10, and the related state-of-the-art studies are discussed in sec-
tion 4.11. Finally, we present our conclusion in Section section 4.12.
4.2 Manifestation of Soft Failures
In this section, we will study how are soft failures typically manifested from transient faults,
and present the insights that motivated the design of CARE.
With increasing concerns about transient faults from HPC communities, a solid under-
standing about the manifestation and propagation of transient faults is key to building an
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efficient resiliency mechanism. Several recent papers [18, 19, 21] have studied the im-
pact of transient faults on scientific applications leveraging empirical fault injection experi-
ments. While all of these studies point out a need for an efficient application level resilience
mechanism against soft failures for scientific applications running on future extreme-scale
systems and some, such as [46], examine the propagation of SDCs, none provided quite
the insights necessary for devising efficient mechanisms for fault recovery. In their studies,
they treat applications as black-boxes. In particular, they do not provide adequate informa-
tion about how soft failures manifest and propagate inside applications, which is critical
for building application level resiliency mechanisms. Here, we focus on exploring how
transient faults manifest, propagate and lead to soft failures (crashes). We are specially
interested in: 1). determining the major causes/symptoms of soft failures; and 2). the la-
tency of their manifestation in terms of number of instructions executed from the injection
point to the crash point. We built a new instruction-level fault injection tool which allows
us to track the propagation of faults from instruction to instruction. Our method first in-
jects faults into target operands of randomly selected dynamic instructions. The faults are
then allowed to propagate while a trace is captured and analysed. We performed empirical
fault injection experiments on five representative scientific workloads, including HPCCG,
CoMD, miniMD, miniFE, and GTC-P (described in Table 4.7), and analyzed the injec-
tions that led to soft failures to find common patterns that can be exploited by a recovery
mechanism. These workloads are from different scientific domains e.g., plasma physics,
molecular dynamics, etc., and implementing different algorithms, such as Lennard-Jones
potential, embedded atom model, and conjugate gradient. For each workload, we per-
formed 10 000 injections based on the single-bit-flip fault model. In the rest of the section,
we will detail the methodology of experiments, and the insights we gleaned from this study.
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4.2.1 Methodology
We build the fault injection tool with GDB and Python. The tool at runtime attaches itself
to the target process randomly, and then injects a fault to the “destination” operand of the
instruction at the attachment point. A “destination” operand is one of architecture states,
e.g. a register, or a memory cell, that is updated by the instruction. We simulate transient
faults from the CPU logic by randomly flipping a bit of the value in the “destination”
operand1. As done in previous studies [21, 20], we chose a single-bit-flip fault model since
it is a conservative way to estimate the causes and the latency for soft failures, considering
that multi-bit-flip faults are more likely to incur soft failures with lower latency than single-
bit-flip faults [19]. We utilized capstone [47], an instruction disassembly framework, to
disassemble the instruction and get its semantic information for identifying destination
operands. The fault is injected at the point right after the instruction is executed, then
execution is continued, tracking fault propagation by recording its execution path. For
each run of an application, only one injection is performed. The trace of instructions that
propagate the fault is then analyzed.
4.2.2 Results and Insights
We categorized the general outcomes of injections into 4 groups: Benign, Soft Failure,
SDC, and Hang. A transient fault is benign (or in short vanishes without causing any
change in execution) if it doesn’t have impact on the application. In such cases, the faulty
value could either refer to an incorrect but valid memory location containing the same
value to the original memory location, or its effect is masked by a program operation (e.g.,
min/max operator that masks injections max/min operand, or bit-wise logical operation
that suppresses most or least significant bits). Otherwise, it will either kill a process (Soft
Failure), lead to incorrect outputs (SDC), or result in a hang state where there is no progress
1Where the destination operand is implicit, e.g. X86 idiv %ecx which divides the value in %edx : %ead
by %ecx and store results in %eax and reminder in %edx, one of the implied destinations, e,g, %eax, is
selected.
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Table 4.1: The overall outcomes of fault injections
Workloads Benign Soft Failure SDC Hang
HPCCG 3118 3409 3472 0
CoMD 6433 2439 1120 8
miniFE 5073 3518 1376 9
miniMD 951 4065 4984 0
GTC-P 6875 1644 1479 2
Table 4.2: Breakdown of soft failures based on symptoms
SIGSEGV SIGBUS SIGABRT Other
HPCCG 3322 32 22 33
CoMD 2195 57 41 146
miniFE 3447 51 6 35
miniMD 4028 6 25 6
GTC-P 1196 49 375 24
on execution. As presented in Table 4.1, even though majority of faults are benign, around
30.15% of them manifest as soft failures, and 24.86% of them lead to SDCs. While faults
happening in FPU are more likely to cause SDCs, the faults manifested in ALU instructions
are more likely to lead to soft failures. There has been a significant amount of work on
detecting SDCs but soft failures that cause application crashes have received less attention.
Once an application crashes, it needs to be restarted incurring costly recovery operations
using check-pointed values.
Table 4.2 breakdowns the soft failures based on symptoms. It shows that, most (72.75% ∼
98.95%, 91.45% on average) of soft failures manifest as SIGSEGV, typically because they
corrupt address calculations and lead applications to access invalid memory locations. In
addition, Table 4.3 presents the latency distribution for single-bit-flip model. As it shows,
the vast majority of soft failures (> 83%) were manifest within 50 or less dynamic in-
structions, with more than half of them manifesting within 10 dynamic instructions. We
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Table 4.3: Latency distribution for soft failures
Latency (Instructions)
≤ 10 11 ∼ 50 51 ∼ 400 > 400
HPCCG 99.09% 0.482% 0.602% 0.301%
CoMD 64.15% 23.57% 7.43% 4.85%
miniFE 48.03% 37.15% 12.4% 2.407%
miniMD 53.65% 22.09% 0.03% 24.23%
GTC-P 52.68% 28.76% 9.7% 8.86%
1 for (i = ipsi_in1; i < ipsi_out1+1; i++){
2 for (k = 0; k < mzeta+1; k++) {
3 phitmp[(mzeta + 1) * (igrid[i] - igrid_in) + k] =




Figure 4.2: Stencil Code Structure
believe such low-latency manifestation implies that the original values (stored in registers
or memory) which were involved in the address computation were likely to be intact during
this latency window, and that it might be possible to recover the calculation and essentially
mask the fault by creating mechanisms to access these original values to recompute the
effective address (which is destroyed due to the fault). Based on these two insights, the
proposed framework is designed specially to protect memory access instructions. During
the compilation of applications, it will build a recovery kernel for each memory access
instruction by cloning its address computations. This kernel will then be utilized to recom-
pute the address when the instruction is contaminated by a fault.
4.3 Why CARE is Important to Scientific Applications ?
Modern scientific applications typically contain stencil codes, which are a class of iterative
kernels. They employ huge arrays to store computation states. The core computation of
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these applications is to update elements of this arrays according to some fixed pattern using
neighboring array elements. Such stencil pattern of data access is repeated for each element
of the array. On one hand, due to this access pattern, applications have to maintain several
data structures (mainly arrays) for storing the neighbor information. Therefore, to update an
element in scientific data arrays, some amount of address calculation is required to access
neighbor cells. CARE is directly motivated by such complex address calculations that
exist inside these scientific applications. As an example, Figure 4.2 presents a piece
of code extracted from GTC-P. It demonstrates that the code involves non-trivial address
calculations when accessing an array element in phitmp, including 3 or 4 additions, 1
subtraction, and 1 multiplication. For many scientific workloads, as shown in Table 4.4,
there exhibit some large percentage of memory accesses (generally 86.85% ∼ 94.08%)
having multiple binary operations in their address calculations; and each memory access
instruction, on average, would involve 2.96 ∼ 5.6 binary operations. In addition, inside
these applications, some variables used in the address calculation are infrequently updated
during their executions, once every few time steps or even unchanged during the whole
execution. Consider the GTC-P code in Figure 4.2 for example, igrid, mtheta are never
updated after they are initialized, and igrid in, mzeta are unchanged when executing the
loop. Because of the complexity of the address computations and the infrequently updated
raw data for the computations, the invalid-memory-access errors due to transient faults are
recoverable with a high probability for these situations. For example, if a failure manifests
when accessing phitmp[(mzeta + 1) ∗ (igrid[i] − igrid in) + k], the fault could have
happened when updating i, k or the rest of computation, such asmzeta+1. While the prior
cases are likely unrecoverable, the later cases are definitely recoverable. As comparison, a
failure which occurs when accessing phitmp[i] is less likely recoverable since the failure
would imply a corrupted value of i, and the likelihood of the correct original value for
that still existing is potentially quite small. Said another way, a failure manifesting in an
address calculation which involves a large number of temporaries is naturally more likely
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Table 4.4: The percentage of memory access instructions involving multiple computations
in their address calculations, and average number of involved operations
HPCCG CoMD miniFE miniMD GTC-P
No. Insts 91.49% 94.05% 94.08% 89.22% 86.85%
Avg. No. ops 4.62 5.6 3.04 2.96 3.60
Figure 4.3: The portion of computations (estimated) dedicated to updating induction vari-
ables
to be recoverable than one which does not.
On the other hand, the core computation for updating array elements are typically ex-
pressed as loops, and array subscript calculations based on the induction variables are es-
sential components for retrieving the array elements. As discussed before, once induction
variables are corrupted, the array subscript calculations get corrupted and processes may
crash due to accesses to nonexistent array elements outside their bounds. Unfortunately and
perhaps surprisingly, updating loop inductions variable could contribute significant portion
of computations in many of these applications, thus they stand a good chance of being cor-
rupted by transient faults in ways that are very challenge to be recovered and need special
attentions. Figure 4.3 roughly estimates the portion of induction-variable computations for
several benchmarks (see Table 4.7 for details). We statically counted the number of instruc-
tions that are involved in updating induction variables based on LLVM IR representations
of applications. They were normalized to the total number of instructions inside loops of
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these applications 2. It surprisingly shows that, for these benchmarks, around 9% ∼ 40%
(average 22% in our applications) of computation is involved in induction variable updates.
If this seems unintuitively large, (e.g. almost 40% of computation) recall that code opti-
mization tends to convert regular patterns of array accesses into pointer-based induction
variables and such accesses could dominate inner loops in these applications. Transient
hardware faults striking these instructions by their nature tend to corrupt address compu-
tations, lead the process to access incorrect array elements (leading to incorrect outputs)
or invalid memory addresses (leading to process crashes). Sharma et al. [48] show that,
based on single-bit-flip fault model, up to 80% of transient faults in loop induction vari-
ables would lead to process crashes. A multi-bit-flip event would be even more likely to
result in a process crash. This result motivated CARE to exploit the side effects of code
optimization techniques, that are widely deployed in modern compilers to enable the re-
covery on corruptions in induction variables and therefore improve its overall recovery rate
against soft failures.
4.4 Code Optimization Techniques
CARE leverages semi-redundancies introduced by code optimization techniques, includ-
ing strength reduction and loop unrolling, to enhance its recovery capability against soft
failures. These code optimization techniques are widely deployed in modern production
compilers to improve the code execution efficiency. In this section, we briefly introduce
these techniques with a focus on how they produce semi-redundancies that can be exploited
for resilience purposes with a simple example.
4.4.1 Strength Reduction
Strength reduction is a code transformation technique in modern compilers that replaces
certain costly instructions with less expensive ones without changing programs’ correct-
2Only loops are considered is because they consume the majority of computation resources of an applica-
tion
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ness. The classic example of strength reduction is to convert expensive multiplications
into efficient additions. Although strength reduction is a global optimization, it is typi-
cally applied to computations in loops, since most of a program’s execution time is typ-
ically spent in a small section of code which is often inside loops that is executed over
and over. (Similarly, this portion of code is also more highly likely to experience transient
errors.) Strength reduction looks for expressions involving a loop invariant value (a value
that doesn’t change within the body of the loop) and an induction variable (a value which
is changing by a known amount in each iteration of the loop). If applicable, strength re-
duction will transform these expressions into an equivalent but more efficient form. For
illustration consider Figure 4.4b which shows the transformed code after applying strength
reduction on the original code in Figure 4.4a. As shown in the figure, the original multi-
plication operation c * i is replaced with (reduced to) a cheaper addition operation k +
c, so the performance of the code is improved. However what’s important for CARE is
that the introduced new expression k + c shares a similar computation pattern to i++.
This provides an opportunity to recover the value of i, if it is corrupted, by referring to k
as long as the initial and step values of these two variables and their updates are available.
In particular, the correct value for i can be recomputed as i = k / c if k is in-tainted
(The initial values for i and k are 0, and their step sizes are 1 and c respectively).
4.4.2 Loop Unrolling
In addition to strength reduction, loop unrolling is another compiler optimization technique
that could introduce semi-redundancies to codes. The main goal of loop unrolling is to
increase a program’s speed by reducing (or eliminating) instructions that control the loop
(such as end-of-loop tests on each iteration), reducing branch penalties, and hiding latency
(e.g., the delay in reading data from memory). To eliminate these computational overheads,
loop unrolling re-writes the loop as a repeated sequence of similar independent statements.
Figure 4.4c shows the transformed code after applying loop unrolling on the original code
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1 c = 7;
2 for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
3 y[i] = c * i;
4 }
(a) Original Example Code
1 c = 7, k = 0;
2 for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
3 y[i] = k;
4 k = k + c;
5 }
(b) Transformed code using Strength Reduction
1 c = 7;
2 for (i = 0; i < N; i+=2) { // assume N%2 = 0
3 y[i] = c * i;
4 y[i+1] = c * (i + 1);
5 }
(c) Transformed code using Loop Unrolling (For simplicity of illustration, here we assume N % =
2. More codes were generated to handle corner case in production compilers)
























Figure 4.5: Overall architecture of the proposed framework
in Figure 4.4a by unfolding the loop body twice. the transformation reduces the number
of end-of-loop tests by almost half in the new code. Meanwhile, it also introduces two
similar computing operations, including i + 2 and i + 1. Although unlike the semi-
redundancies introduced by the strength reduction in that both of these two instructions
depend on variable i, they can also be exploited for resilience purposes through additional
program analysis and code transformations. While the example code assumes N%2 = 0,
this technique can be implemented dynamically even if N is unknown at compile time.
4.5 Overview of the CARE Framework
Given the observations above, we designed the CARE environment to focus on recov-
ery from SIGSEGV faults. It is a compiler-assisted soft failure recovery framework for
scientific applications, and aims to help such applications survive soft failures with negli-
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gible overheads. In this section, we depict the overall architecture of CARE. As presented
in Figure 4.5, the framework consists of two components: 1). Armor, a front-end for con-
structing recovery kernels, and 2). Safeguard, a runtime system for diagnosing the failure
and repairing the corrupted architecture state when a soft failure happens.
Armor is a LLVM pass, and works on LLVM IR representation. It constructs recov-
ery kernels for memory access instructions during the compilation of applications. For
each memory access instruction, CARE will construct a recovery kernel by strategically
extracting instructions involved in its address computation. To minimize the overhead of
CARE, Armor compiles recovery kernels into a stand-alone shared library, which will be
dynamically loaded by Safeguard as needed to repair invalid memory access errors. At
the same time, Armor also generates a Recovery Table which can be considered as the
meta-data of recovery kernels. It contains information about how to access and execute a
recovery kernel, which is needed by the runtime system. Safeguard itself is designed and
implemented as a shared library as well. It will be automatically loaded when a process
is launched by setting the LD PRELOAD environment variable. Upon loading, Safeguard
will overload the default SIGSEGV signal handler of processes to provide recovery service.
Besides such initialization work, Safeguard is not activated unless a soft failure occurs.
The small load-time overhead of installing a signal handler and the tiny memory overhead
for storing the signal handler are its only impact on an application’s execution if a fault
does not occur. Therefore, Safeguard will incur almost negligible overheads during the
normal execution of applications. Upon a invalid memory access error, Safeguard will be
activated by the operating system to diagnose which instruction caused the invalid memory
access. It will disassemble the failed instruction to determine which operand is referring
to a memory address. And based on the address of the instruction, it will then search, load
and execute the related recovery kernel via the help of Recovery Table to recompute the
accessed memory address for the instruction, and update the related operand. To success-
fully execute a recovery kernel, Safeguard will fetch the values of its parameters from the
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1 %idxprom156 = sext i32 %i144.0 to i64
2 %arrayidx157 = getelementptr i32, i32* %7, i64 ←↩
%idxprom156
3 %44 = load i32, i32* %arrayidx157, align 4
4 %arrayidx159 = getelementptr i32, i32* %8, i64 ←↩
%idxprom156
5 %45 = load i32, i32* %arrayidx159, align 4
6 %add160 = add nsw i32 %44, %45
7 %sub161 = sub nsw i32 %add160, %29
8 %mul162 = mul nsw i32 %add66, %sub161
9 %add163 = add nsw i32 %mul162, %k.0
10 %idxprom164 = sext i32 %add163 to i64
11 %arrayidx165 = getelementptr double, double* %12, i64 ←↩
%idxprom164
12 %46 = load double, double* %arrayidx165, align 8
13 %sub169 = sub nsw i32 %44, %29
14 %mul170 = mul nsw i32 %add66, %sub169
15 %add171 = add nsw i32 %mul170, %k.0
16 %idxprom172 = sext i32 %add171 to i64
17 %arrayidx173 = getelementptr double, double* %12, i64 ←↩
%idxprom172
18 store double %46, double* %arrayidx173, align 8
Figure 4.6: LLVM IR Code for the example code in Figure 4.2.
process’s address space. In short, CARE relies on the availability of such values which can
be typically found in persistent locations such as constant pointers or memory or register
values of instructions. Although the overall idea of CARE is straight-forward, it comes
with several challenges. In the rest of the chapter, we will present the design details for
each component, as well as challenges we met and addressed in detail.
4.6 Armor: Building Recovery Kernels
Armor is a compiler pass based on the LLVM framework [49]. It works on LLVM IR, a
light-weight low-level intermediate representation of programs. There are several existing
tools, such as Clang [50], Flang [51], and DragonEgg [52], which can be used to compile
applications into LLVM IR codes. Therefore, the new framework is relatively independent
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of programming languages, and can support a majority of scientific applications written
in C, C++ or FORTRAN. LLVM IR is in static single assignment (SSA) form. Its syntax
is similar to MIPS assembly language, except that LLVM IR has unlimited virtual regis-
ters. Figure 4.6 shows an example LLVM IR code for the stencil code in Figure 4.2. Each
LLVM IR instruction defines a new value which is used by other instructions. In LLVM
IR, memory accesses are issued explicitly through either LoadInst or StoreInst instructions.
For these memory access instructions, Armor starts from their address operands and works
backwardly to identify instructions involved in their address computations. It then clones
and organizes these instructions as a recovery kernel, represented as a normal function in
LLVM IR code. Armor will construct a recovery kernel for each memory access instruc-
tion, except those directly loading from (or storing to) an AllocaInst (representing a local
variable) or a GlobalVariable, since they don’t involve any address computations. Recov-
ery kernels for an application are generated into a separate LLVM module, which is then
compiled into a stand-alone shared library. There are two challenges need to be addressed
by Armor:
First, it is not easy to build a recovery kernel that can be successfully executed at run-
time due to complex interactions of code optimizations. In general, a recovery kernel can
repair transient hardware faults that occur in instructions from which it is cloned, defining
the Coverage Scope for that particular kernel. Therefore, to make a recovery kernel cover
more instructions, Armor should clone as many instructions as possible. However, code
optimizations in compiler’s back-ends for assembly code generation interacts with cover-
age scope in complex ways. In particular, they could make values that are arguments for
recovery kernels unavailable at the memory access instruction, because the related regis-
ter is reused by compiler for storing other values, without being spilled into the stack. In
such case, the kernel is useless. Therefore, Armor cannot aggressively copy all computa-
tions and, during the compiling time of applications, it has to make sure the built kernel be
executed successfully at runtime.
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Second, as discussed before, corruptions in induction variables rise another challenge.
Recovery from such kinds of corruptions is a challenging problem because induction vari-
ables typically employ in-place updates. For every update, the old value of the location
(e.g., the register) holding the induction variable is overwritten by a new value. Therefore,
once corrupted, it is not obvious how to recover a correct value. An intuitive way to ad-
dress this problem is leveraging checkpoints of the variable itself, e.g. storing a backup of
old value before every update. However, this would involve adding instructions leading to
higher register demands inside application’s inner loop. This will add undesirable run-time
overhead to the most critical portions of these applications.
4.6.1 Building Executable Recovery Kernels
To make sure the recovery kernel for an failed instruction is executable, or saying the pa-
rameters of the kernel is always available, Armor will stop the process of extraction when
it meets predefined Terminal Values, where the intuition behind Terminal values is that
they are guaranteed to be found in registers or memory. A formal definition of Terminal
Values appears further down below. Informally, it is very critical to find correct Terminal
Values for recovery kernels, since they are inputs to the kernels. When Safeguard is acti-
vated to repair a fault, these values must be extracted from the process and then provided
to the recovery kernel subroutine in order to recreate the correct address. This requires
that those values be accessible and not optimized away. However, Armor constructs the
recovery kernel at LLVM IR level, and some of the LLVM IR values, like many variables in
high-level languages, could be optimized away when they are compiled into machine code,
particularly when the optimization flag is enabled. To address this challenge, we lever-
aged liveness analysis during the construction of recovery kernels. For a memory access
instruction, the arguments of its recovery kernel should be live at its position. By defini-
tion, a variable is live at a particular point in the program if its value at that point will be
used along at least one path that originates at the given program point. In particular, we
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leverage the following observation which is true about lowering of IR into machine code:
if a value is live at a memory access instruction and its use is non-local (outside the current
basic block), it is not optimized away by machine dependent passes (such as instruction
selection etc) when the LLVM IR codes is lowered into the machine code. Therefore such
a value is eligible as a parameter to the recovery kernel. Based on this insight, Armor
leverages the algorithm in Figure 4.7 to extract address related computations for a memory
access instruction. It will stop the process of extracting instructions when it meets one of
the following LLVM IR instructions/values, since they imply start-points of the computa-
tion:
1. An AllocaInst which represents an variable allocated on the function stack.
2. A GlobalVariable which represents a global variable allocated on the data section of
process.
3. An Argument which represents a function parameter.
4. A PHINode that represents a loop induction variable.
5. A CallInst calling a complex function. We treat the CallInst differently based on
the complexity of the callee. Armor will stop the process of extraction if the callee
updates global variables, arguments passed to it (including memory regions pointed
by arguments), or allocates new memory regions. In contrast, if the callee is a simple
math operator, e.g., sqrt, it will be treated as a normal binary instruction.
6. Terminal Value. A Terminal Value for a memory access instruction I , is a LLVM IR
instruction/value which is live at I , with at least one of its operands is dead at I and
the dead operand cannot be computed from other live instructions/values. Secondly,
as stated earlier, the LLVM value which is live should have a non-local use outside
the current basic block (which will ensure that the machine-dependent passes will
not eliminate or fold the value making it unavailable). Finally, if every operand of
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1 bool isExpandable(Value *V, Value *MemAccInst) {
2 if (isa<AllocaInst>(V) || isa<GlobalVariable>(V)




6 auto operands = getOperands(V);
7 for (op: operands) {






13 void getParamsAndStmts(Value *MemAccInst,
14 vector<Value *> &Params,
15 vector<Value *> &Stmts) {
16 vector<Value *> Workspace;
17 Value *Addr = getAddrOperand(MemAccInst);
18 Workspace.push_back(Addr);
19 while (!Workspace.empty()) {
20 Value *V = Workspace.back();
21 Workspace.pop_back();
22 if (isExpandable(V)) {
23 Stmts.insert(V);
24 auto operands = getOperands(V);
25 for(op: operands) {
26 if (isa<ConstantData>(Op)) continue;
27 Workspace.insert(Workspace.begin(), op);
28 }
29 } else Params.insert(V);
30 }
31 }
Figure 4.7: Pseudo code for extracting address computations
a LLVM instruction/value is live or can be computed from other live values, Armor
can continue the extraction of computations to extend the coverage scope for the
kernel.
For illustration, Figure 4.8 presents a computation-dependency graphs among a set of
variables. It shows the address computations for the LoadInst in node 1. To build a recovery
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kernel, Armor will start from node 2 and check liveness of base and offset. Since the
offset is live at node 1, and base can be computed from a live variable gtc input in node
9, it will continue the extraction and take the instruction in node 2 as a statement in the
recovery kernel, and then evaluate node 3 and node 11. The instructions in node 3 and
node 11 will be copied as statements too, since both mul and call are live at node 1, and
densityi can be computed from node 9. Node 10 is handled similarly to node 11. And node
4 and node 5 are then evaluated respectively. For node 4, its value mul will be considered
as a parameter of the recovery kernel, since its operand sub is not live at node 1, and it
cannot be also computed from other live variables. Similarly, for node 5, Armor will stop
the search until it meet node 6 and node 7. Finally, the recovery kernel for the memory
access instruction in node 1 will clone the instructions in node 2, node 3, node 5, node 10,
node 11, and node 12 as statements and take the values in node 4 (mul), node 6 (delz),
node 7 (mzeta), and node 9 (gtc input) as parameters of the kernel.
4.6.2 Recovery from Induction Variables
To recover from corruptions in induction variables, CARE exploits side effects introduced
by code optimization techniques deployed in modern production compilers. The philos-
ophy behind CARE is pretty straightforward. For a given induction variable i, updated
as i = i + si, CARE will leverage scalar-evolution analysis to find another induction
variable(s) k in the same code region, which is a loop, such that k is updated with a com-
putation pattern (k = k + sk) similar to i and k is not used with i at the same time to
compute a memory address (e.g., y[i+k]). CARE then pairs them together. And k is
considered as a partner (or co-related induction variable) to i, such that if i is corrupted





× si + i0 (4.1)
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arrayidx = base + offset
d5 = load arrayidx
offset = mul + callbase = load densityi
densityi = gtc_input + 8 mul = sub + tmp call = abs_min(wtion, delz)
Sub = jtion + igrid tmp = 1 + mzeta
jtion = … igrid = …
mzeta = …




































Figure 4.8: The illustration of constructing recovery kernels. mzeta and delz are computed
from variables dead at node 1
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1 for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
2 sum += *(A++); // from sum += A[i];
3 }
Figure 4.9: A sample example.
where, i0 and k0 are initial values of i and k respectively. For every induction variable
involved in the recovery kernel for a memory access (built in subsection 4.6.1), CARE will
try to find its pair in the same loop, and add the necessary recovery code to the kernel.
While it would very difficult to find such computation pairs in original source codes, the
code optimization techniques deployed in modern compilers, such as strength reduction and
loop unrolling, would introduce more opportunities in transformed codes (See section 4.4),
which are only accessible by compiler passes. To be able to successfully recover i when
it is corrupted, CARE must know or have accesses to initial values of i and k and their
step sizes at runtime. In other words, when i is corrupted, CARE should be able to: 1).
find its partner k; 2) their initial values i0 and k0; 3) their step sizes si and sk; and 4) the
current value of k. If these values are not constant numbers, CARE has to make sure they
are stored in somewhere (e.g., register or stack) during the code generation pass, such that
they are available (the location storing them is not reused by others) regarding less when
they are accessed during runtime.
Although semi-redundancies were introduced by the aforementioned code optimization
techniques to the transformed codes, they might be not exploitable for resilience purposes
due to following challenges:
1. No partner is exposed. In such case, even though these techniques introduced semi-
redundancies, but they don’t introduce new variables. An example is shown in Fig-
ure 4.4c where i + 1 shares a similar computation pattern to i += 2. However, it
is useless to CARE since they both depend on i. In particular, if accessing to y[i]
failed because of a fault in i, there is no partner available for CARE to recover it.
2. Sometimes initial values or step sizes are not available at runtime when a failure is
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1 c = 7;
2 for (i = 0, k=1; i < N; i+=2, k+=2) {
3 y[i] = c * i;
4 y[k] = c * k;
5 }
(a) Independent code promotion
1 S = A;
2 B = S;
3 for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
4 sum += *(B++); // from sum += A[i];
5 }
(b) Micro-checkpoint
Figure 4.10: Code Transformations in Armor. C/C++ are used for illustration only. CARE
actually works on LLVM IR code.
detected as illustrated in Figure 4.9. In this case, CARE would be able to find the
partner for i, which is A, but it may fail to find its initial value A0. This is because the
code generator typically maps A to a register, saying %rax, and updates it in-place
simply with add %rax, 8. Therefore, the initial value for A is not preserved in
applications’ process address spaces.
In order to address these problems, CARE introduces two additional code transforma-
tions, named independent compute promotion (ICP) and micro-checkpoint. For the first
situation, CARE leverages ICP to transform dependant computations into independent
ones, if possible, by introducing new variables. And for “vanishing initial values” chal-
lenge, CARE introduces code to store (checkpoint) related initial values in the stack, such
that they are always available when they are needed for recovering corrupted induction
variables. The following subsections present their details.
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1. Independent Compute Promotion
Typically, semi-redundancies introduced by loop-unrolling exhibiting in the code in form
of derived induction values (e.g., i + 1 in Figure 4.4c). Per discussion before, such
semi-redundancies can’t be directly exploited by Armor, so we introduce compiler pass,
ICP, which transforms these derived induction values into independent computations. It
will create new induction variables along with their related update instructions to replace
original derived induction values. For illustration, Figure 4.10a shows the transformed
code derived the code in Figure 4.4c, in which a new variable k is created and original i
+ 1 is replaced with k and k + 2. In particular, note that k is completely independent
from i, therefore they can be inferred to recover each other if either one is corrupted. It is
worthwhile to note that while ICP does demand an additional register, it doesn’t introduce
new computation. Such change is often hidden in superscalar processors. Hence, it has
negligible penalties to applications’ performance.
Algorithm 1 shows the core steps of independent compute promotion. For each loop
in LLVM IR codes, ICP iterates over each binary operator in the loop. For those who
are directly used (both directly and indirectly) in address computations, Armor will create
new induction variables to replace them, if they can be expressed in form of (i = i +
s) based on scalar-evolution analysis, where s is a loop invariant value (it doesn’t need to
be a constant).
2. Micro-checkpoint
Micro-checkpoint is applied only to induction variables whose initial values are not live
across the loop body. If a value is not live across the loop body, the location for holding this
value could be reused by other variables at runtime, which means it could be not accessible
by the recovery mechanism. For these induction variables, CARE will checkpoint their
initial values into the stack frame by creating new local variables and inserting a store
instruction. The transformed code for the code in Figure 4.9 is shown in Figure 4.10b,
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Algorithm 1 The Pseudo Code for Independent Compute Promotion.
function DOINDEPENDENCEPROMOTION(loop)














in which a new local variable S is allocated to store the initial value (base address) of A.
And a new variable B is introduced as an alias to A to iterate over elements in the array.
And B will be identified as the partner to i. While B = S looks redundant, but it is not
trivial. It provides CARE heuristics about where to find initial values for B. Notably, the
new code has substantially similar performance as the original code, since the instruction
insertions are outside the loop body. The pseudo code for micro-checkpoint is shown in
Algorithm Algorithm 2. It iterates over each induction variable of a loop. If init is not a
constant number, and it is not live (based on liveness analysis) at the end of corresponding
loop, CARE will then create a new local variable on the stack to store its initial value.
Please note that while the C/C++ programming language were used for clarity in above
examples, CARE actually works on LLVM IR codes, which are an intermediate represen-
tations of applications.
4.7 Recovery Table: Communicating between Armor and Safeguard
In addition to the recovery library containing the recovery kernel subroutines, Armor
also generates a Recovery Table to describe recovery kernels for Safeguard. It contains
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Algorithm 2 The pseudo code for micro-checkpoint
function DOCHECKPOINTS(loop)





if !Const && !Live then
V ar ← CREATELOCALVARIABLE
CREATESTORE(Var, IV)





information about how to access a recovery kernel and which are the parameters to the
kernel. The Recovery Table is a key-value table as shown in Table 4.5. For each recovery
kernel in the recovery library, Armor will register an entry for it in the table. The recovery
table contains three pieces of information:
1. key, which represents an instruction. Each memory access instruction should be
associated with a unique key, which will be used to retrieve the related recovery
kernel.
2. symbol, which represents a recovery kernel. The symbol could be simply the func-
tion name of the recovery kernel. It will be used to load the actual implementation of
the recovery kernel from the recovery library.
3. parameters, which describes the inputs required by the kernel. They are used to
retrieve expected input values from the corrupted process.
There are two challenges to be addressed here. First Armor and Safeguard must agree
on the selection of the key, which is closely associated with the memory access instruction.
For a memory access instruction in LLVM IR and its corresponding assembly instruction
in machine code, both Armor and Safeguard should be able to generate the same key to
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Table 4.5: Recovery table for describing recovery kernels
key symbol parameters
key1 care recovery k1(int16, int, int) a, b, c
key2 care recovery k2(float, int32) m, n
key3 care recovery k3(int8, int64) d, e
point to the recovery kernel. Armor must generate a key at compile-time and associate it
with the recovery kernel; meanwhile, Safeguard be able to generate the same key using
the fault location, and use it to find the recovery kernel. Similarly, parameters are keys to
the required input values of the kernel. Safeguard relies on them to retrieve input values
for the kernel from the process’s address space.
Intuitively, the instruction address is a good candidate for the key, since each instruction
has unique address. It is stable, and easy to get for Safeguard. However, it is not available
to Armor, since it is not generated until the code generation phase. Relying on it would
require the modification of the code generation passes in modern compilers. To avoid this
complexity, we leveraged the debug information subsystem of modern compilers, which
is used to encode source-level program information for machine code. Although CARE
leveraged this subsystem, it doesn’t have to rely on the debug data generated by compiler.
In debug data of a program, each instruction is associated with location description, which
contains the source file name, the line number and the column number. CARE takes the
tuple of (file, line, column) as the key to an instruction, since they are accessible both in
LLVM IR and in machine code. Specially, CARE doesn’t require the real debug data of
the program, since it won’t map instructions to original source-code statements. CARE
only requires that the debug data is unique for each memory access instruction. Armor
can generate a fake debug data for each memory access instruction if the debug flag is
not enabled. On the other hand, if debug flag is enabled during the compilation, Armor
needs to resolve the conflicts for some instructions that end up sharing the same debug
data. As an additional complexity, since x86 64 assembly supports CISC-style memory
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<loclist with 2 entries follows>
[0] 0x422cd4∼0x422d3c: DW OP reg11
[1] 0x422d3c∼0x422fe4: DW OP breg7+4
DW AT name zion3
DW AT decl file “/path/to/source/file.c”
DW AT decl line 156
access in computations (e.g., “add (%rax, %rcx, 8), %rdx” reads data from memory and
adds it to %rdx), some of memory access instructions in LLVM IR might be merged with
the related binary instruction during the code generation. Hence, Armor also attaches the
debug information for memory access instructions to the instructions that directly use their
results.
The use of debug mechanism also addresses the second challenge about retrieving argu-
ments for a recovery kernel. For each parameter of a kernel, Armor will create a variable
description for it by simply assigning a unique name for each parameter. Based on the vari-
able description, the debug information subsystem of the compiler will automatically gen-
erate a debug information entry (DIE) to describe the variable in machine code, as shown
in Table 4.6. A DIE contains several attributes which are associated with the variable. An
important attribute is the “DW AT location”, which describes the location for a variable. It
contains 2 pieces of information, including address ranges and corresponding location of
the variable. For example, item [0] in Table 4.6 describes that the variable zion3 is located
in a register if PC address resides in [0x422cd4, 0x422d3c), and the item [1] describes that
the variable is located on the stack at the offset 4 to the frame point register if PC address
is in [0x422d3c, 0x422fe4).
69
4.8 Safeguard: Providing Recovery Service
Safeguard is the runtime system of CARE, providing recovery service for applications by
setting up and executing recovery kernels constructed by Armor. Safeguard is built as a
shared library, and it is designed to be loaded automatically by setting theLD PRELOAD
environment variable. Leveraging the “constructor” attribute in modern compilers, Safe-
guard will add a signal handler for SIGSEGV immediately after it is loaded. Except this
initialization work, Safeguard is not activated until a SIGSEGV fault occurs. Therefore, it
has almost zero runtime overhead during the normal execution of applications. To mini-
mize the memory overhead, Safeguard only loads recovery kernels when a crash-causing
error is detected, and will immediately release the related memory after the repair. Upon a
failure, the steps taken by Safeguard are shown in Algorithm Algorithm 3. It first retrieves
the address for the instruction that issued the SIGSEGV signal. Based on the address, Safe-
guard will read the line table of the debug data to get the key for the instruction, and then
use the key to find the appropriate recovery kernel from the Recovery Table. If successful,
it will load the recovery library, retrieve the kernel implementation, decode the debug data
to find and retrieve values for parameters, and then execute the recovery kernel. Finally, it
will disassemble the instruction, to find its address operand, and update that operand with
the value computed by the kernel. If the address operand involves both a base register
and a index register, e.g. “mov 8(%rbx, %r8, 4), %eax”, Safeguard will update the index
register (%r8) by default, assuming that index register is computed more frequently than
base register, and are more likely to experience faults. It will recompute the value for the
index register based on the value in base register, and the value returned by recovery ker-
nel. Before making the actual update, Safeguard will check whether the kernel-computed
address is the same with the invalid address accessed by the instruction. The update is
performed only if they are different. Otherwise, it implies that the fault happened to an
instruction that is out of the coverage scope of the recovery kernel, and its argument values
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are contaminated. CARE lacks of ability to recover such failures. 3
4.9 Prototype
We implemented a prototype of CARE on X86 64 platform and Linux OS. We imple-
mented Armor based on LLVM 6.0.1. Armor treated some LLVM CallInst instructions
as a normal binary operators, if they simply call some mathematical kernels, e.g, sqrt, or
some user-implemented functions that don’t update global variables and arguments. But it
doesn’t clone the implementation of these callee functions, hence, when the recovery ker-
nels are compiled into a shared library, it is necessary to build them with binary source files
containing the user-implemented simple functions, and link them with necessary libraries.
On the other hand, Safeguard mainly implements a signal handler for SIGSEGV. It
contains a constructor, which will be executed automatically (by setting LD PRELOAD) to
setup/overload the signal handler for processes. The benefit of this design is that Safeguard
doesn’t require source code changes to applications. Safeguard computes the address for
the failed instruction based on the location where the failure occurs. Failure can happen
3Note that a real segmentation fault resulting from program bug or erroneous input will fall into this
category as well. CARE will declare it non-recoverable and simply propagate the SIGSEGV.
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to either an instruction belonging to the application code or to one belonging to the library
code. For a failure occurring on applications’ code instruction, it will directly use the
PC (Program Counter) value corresponding to the failed instruction as the address of the
instruction, and for a failure that happened in a shared library, the offset, calculated as
PC − base, is used as the address of the instruction. Here, base is the address at which
the library is loaded. This design is mainly restricted due to the differences in mechanisms
in terms of encoding the debug data for executable binaries versus the shared libraries.
Getting the correct address is the key to retrieve the correct recovery kernel, and related
parameters. Safeguard utilizes dladdr to diagnose the location of failures. The failure
location also guides the Safeguard to access the correct file for the required debug data.
In addition, Safeguard relies on the libdwarf [53] library to read the debug data and the
libffi [54] library to execute calls to the recovery kernel. Since “ffi call” takes pointers as
arguments, the address of a variable, instead of a value, is retrieved from the process space.
Finally, recovery table is implemented based on google protobuf-3.6.0 [55], and the MD5
hash of the debug information tuple (file, line, column) is computed with the mhash [56]
library and used as the key.
4.10 Evaluation
This section presents evaluation results of CARE. We are mainly interested in the fol-
lowing questions: 1) What is CARE’s performance in terms of failure recovery rates?; and
2) What is its overheads to normal executions of applications? In the rest of the section,
we will introduce the evaluation methodology and environment, present evaluation results,
and discuss the advantages and limitations of CARE.
4.10.1 Methodology
We evaluated CARE on an X86 64 platform with up to 64 compute nodes, with each node
equipped with 48 cores (3072 total cores) and 128GB of memory. We performed fault
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injections to emulate transient faults with a methodology similar to that introduced in sec-
tion 4.2, except that we updated the method of randomly selecting a dynamic instruction,
such that injections are only performed to instructions from the application itself and not
to library code. In the updated tool, we first profiled the number of executions for each
static instruction(from applications only) using the Intel Pin tool. Then we randomly select
a static instruction for injection based on the numerical distribution of their executions. Fi-
nally, we generate a random number based on the executions of the selected instruction to
determine the point at which the fault would be injected. In other words, a dynamic instruc-
tion is approximately represented by a pair (I, n), which means the fault will be injected
to the instruction I after it is executed n times. In all, we examined around 1000 ∼ 2000
injections that led to SIGSEGV errors. In the discussions below it is important to note that
CARE is largely insensitive to the exact fault model in use. Different choices for fault
models would likely change the relative ratios of fault outcomes (such as provided in sec-
tion 4.2), but if a fault triggers a soft failure, the number of corrupted bits will not impact
CARE’s operation. Only the actual location of the fault will impact whether or not CARE
can recover from it.
4.10.2 Workloads
We mainly evaluated CARE with 4 scientific workloads including GTC-P, HPCCG, min-
iMD and CoMD, as well as the NPB benchmark suite. Table 4.7 presents a brief intro-
duction for these workloads. We skipped miniFE since it heavily relies on the C++ STL
library which is not fully supported in current prototype. For each workload, the compile-
time overheads spent on building recovery kernels and the statistical information about the
recovery libraries are presented in Table 4.8. As shown in the table, Armor only takes a
few seconds to analyze the program and construct the recovery kernels. More than 90% of
the overheads were spent on liveness analysis. Despite this offline compile-time overheads
shown, CARE incurs almost zero runtime overhead during the normal execution of the
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A simple conjugate gradient benchmark code for a 3D chimney
domain on an arbitrary number of processors.
CoMD C
A reference implementation of typical classical molecular dy-
namics algorithms and workloads as used in materials science.
miniMD C++
A simple, parallel molecular dynamics (MD) code. It performs
parallel molecular dynamics simulation of a Lennard-Jones or
a EAM system
miniFE C++
a Finite Element mini-application which implements a couple
of kernels representative of implicit finite-element applications.
It assembles a sparse linear-system from the steady-state con-
duction equation on a brick-shaped problem domain of linear
8-node hex elements. It then solves the linear-system using a
simple un-preconditioned conjugate-gradient algorithm
GTC-P C
A 2D domain decomposition version of the GTC global gy-
rokinetic PIC code for studying micro-turbulent core transport.
It solves the global, nonlinear gyrokinetic equation using the
particle-in-cell method.
NPB C
The NAS Parallel Benchmark (NPB) suite is a small set of pro-
grams derived from computational fluid dynamics (CFD) appli-
cations. It consists of 5 kernels and 3 pseudo-applications. In
this work, NPB3.0-C version is used.
workloads without faults, since it only calls “sigaction” to register signal handlers, which
takes a few microseconds. And the memory overheads of CARE is fixed to 27MB (< 1%
for evaluated workloads), which is mainly occupied by partial of LLVM and protobuf li-
braries used by Safeguard for encoding/decoding recovery tables. We believe this over-
head is negligible for scientific applications that are typically with gigabytes of memory
footprints. In this section, we mainly focus on evaluating the fault coverage and recovery
time of CARE. For these workloads, faults are injected to instructions from applications 4.
4CARE relies on source code to build recovery kernels, and recovery from transient faults that occur
in library code requires the recompilation of libraries from their source codes leveraging CARE, which is
beyond the scope of our current work, IR recovery binary is the key.
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Table 4.8: Statistics of Recovery Kernels
# of Kernels Avg. # of IR Insts Normal Compile Time (s) Armor Overhead (s)
HPCCG 255 2.51 3.575 1.43
CoMD 1143 2.63 1.486 1.17
miniMD 2611 8.2 4.215 1.52
GTC-P 2786 19.18 2.322 2.67
BT 2474 1.17 1.843 0.11
CG 120 1.84 0.617 0.11
EP 30 2.43 0.53 0.05
FT 171 1.81 0.719 0.14
IS 37 1.62 0.47 0.06
LU 1210 1.5 1.25 1.24
MG 547 4.8 0.84 0.43
SP 1462 1.67 1.36 1.64
4.10.3 Fault Coverage of the Basic Framework
CARE is a process recovery technique, which aims to recover processes from invalid
memory access errors caused by transient faults. In this subsection, we evaluated the per-
formance of CARE’s basic framework based on fault-injection experiments on single pro-
cess. The recovery capability for induction variables is disabled in this experiment, since
we aim to understand the efficiency of the fundamental framework here. We used GTC-P,
HPCCG, miniMD and CoMD. We evaluated CARE when these applications are compiled
with “-O0” (No-opt) or “-O1” (Opt) flags. To support “-O2” and “-O3”, which will per-
form code vectorizations, our current prototype still needs extra engineering work to encode
vector-type parameters in recovery tables.
Figure 4.11 presents the fault coverage of CARE on the evaluated workloads. On aver-
age, CARE can recover 83.54% of injected SIGSEGV faults, with up to 96% for HPCCG
when it is compiled without optimization. CARE achieved such high fault coverage mainly
due to the fact that majority of SIGSEGV faults manifest quickly, typically within only a
few dynamic instructions after they occur. The raw data used in address computations
is less likely to get updated during such a short time window, especially in the evaluated
workloads where they are infrequently updated at the algorithm level. Therefore, CARE
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Figure 4.11: Fault Coverage of the Basic Framework of CARE.
has a good chance to recompute the addresses. Despite some variance, code optimization
didn’t introduce significant reduction for the fault coverage of CARE. For miniMD, it im-
proved fault coverage by around 7%. this mainly due to code optimization extending the
coverage scope of recovery kernels in the miniMD core. This scenario can be illustrated
as follows. Figure 4.12 shows two memory accesses. When the code is compiled without
optimization, CARE can recover errors occurring during the computation of a+ b+ c+ d
for case 1, but can only recovery errors occurring in a+ c for case 2 because of the imme-
diate update of a and c in line 6 and 7. Code optimization helps to optimize the case 2 to
be like case 1 by optimizing out unnecessary memory updates. As a result, the recovery
scope of the kernel is extended. Similarly, there is a slight improvement for GTC-P as well.
For HPCCG and CoMD, however, code optimization reduced the coverage by 35% and
21%, respectively. For HPCCG, which is a relative simple kernel, a significant portion of
dynamic instructions are involved in updating the loop induction variables after the code
optimization, therefore they are more likely to be selected by our tool to inject faults. More
importantly, because of the code optimization, loop induction variables will be allocated in
registers, and updated in-place. If they are corrupted, CARE cannot acquire correct values
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1 int a, b, c, d, *array;
2 array[a+b+c+d]; // case 1
3
4 a += b;
5 c += d;
6 array[a+c]; // case 2
Figure 4.12: Code optimization could help extend the coverage scope for case 2 to the same
on for case 1
for related recovery kernels, leaving many faults unrecoverable. For CoMD, however, it is
mainly because recovery kernels don’t have enough coverage scope due to liveness issues.
It is worth noting that during a recovery of failure, CARE will not substitute silent data
corruptions (SDCs) for failures as is possible with more heuristic based recovery meth-
ods [57]. This is because the computation of a recovery kernel is based on the raw data
fetched from the process.If raw data is contaminated by a fault, the recovery kernel will
definitely generate a wrong address which is the same as the one accessed by the corrupted
instruction. Otherwise, CARE is guaranteed to get correct address, since it exactly clones
the computation from applications.
4.10.4 Contribution of Induction Variable Recovery Scheme
In this subsection, we demonstrate the advantage of CARE’s induction variable recovery
scheme. Each recovery kernel built by the fundamental framework is enhanced with the
recovery codes for involved induction variables. In the rest of this section, we refer this
scheme as IterPro and continue to use CARE as the reference to the fundamental frame-
work. In this experiment, the HPCCG and the NPB benchmark suite were used, since they
could be more sensitive to the induction variable recovery scheme based on results in sub-
section 4.10.3. Similar to subsection 4.10.3, these codes were compiled into LLVM IR
codes with clang using the “-O1” flag. An difference is that strength reduction and loop
unrolling code optimization passes were also applied. These optimized LLVM IR codes
were referred as “baseline” in the rest of the section. IterPro works on these “baseline”
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Figure 4.13: Failure Recovery Rates of CARE and IterPro. It shows the advantage of
exploiting side-effects of code optimizations and the efficiency of IterPro code transfor-
mations.
codes, performing the required code transformations, building recovery kernels and gener-
ating the final binaries.
We compared the IterPro against the fundamental framework CARE. For IterPro, we
consider two setups: 1) a fractional evaluation when CARE’s enhanced code transforma-
tions are not applied (that is the induction recovery scheme is applied to unaugmented
LLVM-generated code), and 2) a comprehensive evaluation when the code transformations
are applied. They are respectively labeled as IterPro-B and IterPro-C. This allows us to
both understand the relative contribution of the induction variable recovery scheme over the
simpler and fundamental recovery approach of CARE, and to see the relative importance
of the additional transformation passes in IterPro (and the attendant minor instruction ad-
ditions and register reservations implied by those additional passes).
Figure 4.13 presents the failure recovery rate for each considered scheme 5. As shown
in the figure, for the evaluated workloads, IterPro-C improved recovery rate for 8 out of 9
evaluated benchmarks as compared to CARE. On average, IterPro-C can recover 82.86%
5It is necessary to note that, in this experiment, the recovery rate for HPCCG under the CARE scheme is
different with the recovery rate in subsection 4.10.3 mainly due to the interference from loop unrolling and
strength reduction.
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of injected SIGSEGV faults, while CARE recovers 59.7% of these failures. For 3 of them,
including FT, SP and HPCCG, it improved the recovery rate by more than 2×. On an
average, it improved recovery rate by 1.6× across all benchmarks. IterPro-C can achieve
such significant improvements mainly because of its ability to recover from corruptions in
induction variables, which is not enabled in CARE. The figure also shows the contribution
of IterPro’s code augmentations for resilience by comparing the recovery rate of IterPro-B
and IterPro-C. As shown in the figure, the average recovery rate for IterPro-B is 65.69%,
which is about 6% higher than CARE, but around 15% lower than IterPro-C. As compared
to IterPro-B, IterPro-C achieved significant improvements (1.37× on average) for many
benchmarks. This is a significant improvement in recovery rates, but unlike IterPro-B,
those passes do involve code generation changes, hence we must consider their impact on
application performance.
The improvement of IterPro-C would undoubtedly attribute to the introduced code
transformations. These extensions to the normal LLVM code generation are key to the suc-
cess of IterPro-C in that they significantly add to the set of faults from which IterPro can
recover by introducing “partner” induction variables for some cases where none naturally
exist, and storing away necessary initial values where they would not have been otherwise
available. In other words, they introduce more “recoverable” introduction variables into
codes increasing their resilience. Table 4.9 shows the impact of introduced code trans-
formations by comparing the number of recoverable induction variables in baseline codes
and in IterPro generated codes. As shown in the table, IterPro’s additional LLVM passes
increased the number of recoverable induction variables by 4% ∼ 500% (72.65% on aver-
age) for 7 out of 9 benchmarks. For two others (EP and IS from NPB), IterPro’s additional
code transformations introduce a recovery opportunity for induction variables where none
existed before (marked by BIG).
In the rest of the paper, IterPro is referred as to IterPro-C.
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Table 4.9: Number of recoverable induction variables respectively in baseline and IterPro
transformed codes.
Benchmark # of Loops Baseline IterPro Improvement
HPCCG 30 38 43 13.16%
BT 177 253 277 9.49%
CG 38 8 40 500%
EP 12 0 4 BIG
FT 53 46 48 4.35%
IS 7 0 12 BIG
LU 189 340 370 8.82%
MG 81 32 64 200%
SP 316 364 474 30.22%
4.10.5 Recovery Time
Recovery time measures the time required by Safeguard to recover from a fault. Clearly a
single faulted computation might feed into several memory access instructions. What might
not be intuitively obvious is that in this situation, Safeguard could be activated several
times, recovering the effects of each manifestation of the fault. Figure 4.14 shows that
CARE can recover a process from a SIGSEGV fault with only a few tens of milliseconds.
In fact, only a tiny percentage of that recovery time is spent in the generated recovery
kernel. They generally only contain a few instructions related to address computations and
while their use is key to CARE, their actual portion of the recovery time is negligible. In
fact, for each activation, more than 98% of the recovery time is spent on preparing the
execution of recovery kernels, including diagnosing the failure, loading recovery table and
recovery library, and retrieving arguments from stalled process.
4.10.6 Impact on Parallel Jobs
In this subsection, we examine the impact of CARE on MPI parallel jobs. Workloads in-
cluding GTC-P, HPCCG, miniMD and CoMD were used since they have MPI support. We
run the workloads with 512 processes and 6 threads on a cluster with 64 nodes (3072 cores).
For each run, we injected a CARE-recoverable fault to rank 0 of the job. We wrote a wrap-
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Figure 4.14: Recovery time of CARE
per to PMPI Init, in which an injection process is created and attached to rank 0 using
ptrace. For a injection point (I, n), the injection process will set a break-point at I , stop
the rank 0 after the instruction I is executed n times, and then contaminate the destination
operand of the target instruction and continue the execution of process. We performed 100
injections, one injection per-run. Figure 4.15 compares the execution time of parallel jobs
when a SIGSEGV fault occurred in rank 0 and is repaired by CARE. It shows that, despite
some execution variance across different runs, CARE can almost completely mask the im-
pact of recoverable SIGSEGV faults to parallel jobs. It can help parallel jobs to survive
invalid memory access errors caused by transient faults. With the protection from CARE,
parallel jobs when experiencing an invalid memory access error can finish their computa-
tions with almost no delays as compared to their normal executions. This is due to the low
recovery time of CARE. In comparison, even a small run of GTC-P relying upon check-
point/restart would require at a minimum dozens of seconds (14.367s, 25.946s, or 37.56s
on average to recover from a failure if checkpoint is respectively scheduled every 20, 50,
or 75 time-steps) to recover from a failure, even if some automatic restart mechanism were
available and the new job were to be scheduled immediately.
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Figure 4.15: Parallel jobs can finish the computations without delays with SIGSEGV re-
covered by CARE
4.10.7 Failures in Shared Library – BLAS
BLAS is a popular linear algebra library written in FORTRAN. It prescribes a set of low-
level routines for performing common linear algebra operations, and is widely used in many
scientific applications and machine learning workloads. BLAS routines are categorized
into three levels, which correspond to the degree of the polynomial. In this subsection, its
preliminary evaluation results are presented.
We rebuilt the BLAS from its source code (copied from LAPACK-3.8.0) as a shared
library (“libblas.so”). The test program sblat1 (in “TESTING/sblat1.f”) for REAL level
1 blas, which is provided by the package, was used as the driver to the library. sblat1 is
dynamically linked to “libblas.so”. We randomly injected faults into either BLAS or sblat1.
Table 4.10 briefly presents the statistics of recovery kernels for sblat1 and BLAS, and the
performance achieved by CARE for them. It shows that CARE achieved around 83%
coverage with almost negligible overheads. We should point out that sblat1 only covers
12 REAL level-1 routines, which is a small fraction of procedures provided by BLAS.
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Table 4.10: Statistics and Performance for sblat1/BLAS
# Kernels Normal Compile time (S) Armor Overhead (S) Coverage Recovery Time
BLAS 10931 6.89 4.973
83.49% 5.7ms
sblat1 187 1.78 1.98
While a detailed evaluation for BLAS is currently underway, the preliminary results in
this subsection demonstrate that CARE effectively supports the recovery of failures which
could occur in libraries with good coverage, small overheads and recovery times.
4.11 Related Work
Detection and recovery from failures are not new topics in HPC and other environ-
ments [41, 43, 20, 21, 58], so there is significant prior work to consider. In this section, we
present a brief survey of studies most related to CARE.
Studies in [18, 19, 21] examined the impact of transient faults on scientific applications.
Their results showed that a significant portion of transient faults could manifest as soft
failures. This motivated us to study how soft failures manifest inside scientific applications
and whether there are common features that can be explored to design an efficient resilience
mechanism for them, resulting in the design of CARE. Georgakoudis et al. [59] and Chang
et al. [60] designed and evaluated new fault injection tools for transient faults. While these
tools are valuable to the community, they are not a good fit for CARE because they either
work on high-level intermediate representations (LLVM machine IR) which is inaccurate
as compared binary-level injections, or incur high overheads (3× slowdown) making it
infeasible to run large scale (∼100 000 injections) fault injection experiments.
Besides CARE, there are several studies on online recovery from process failures such
that applications can continue their normal executions. Rx [61] aims to recover from a
process failure by rolling applications back to a previous safe status, and then continuing
its execution with a minor modification to its environment. Rx is motivated by the ob-
servation that many program bugs are associated with the setup of process environments,
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so changing the environment setup could avoid the crashes. Its techniques could help han-
dle transient faults by simply replaying the computation without changing the environment,
however its basic operation requires at least partial application checkpoints which are likely
to have significant cost. RCV [57] is another online failure recovery technique for divide-
by-zero (SIGFPE) and null-dereference (SIGSEGV) errors. RCV’s approach explores a set
of heuristics for recovery. For instance, it returns zero as the default result of the divide
for divide-by-zero errors, discards invalid write instructions that accessing near-to-zero ad-
dresses and returns 0 for invalid read operations. These techniques are computationally
inexpensive and may succeed in getting the application to continue, but are likely to in-
troduce SDCs as a side effect. LetGo [20] shares a similar idea to RCV, and is specially
designed for handling soft failures in scientific applications. Its recovery strategy employs
a set of heuristics too. Upon a failure, it will reset architecture states to a pre-defined value,
and then continue the execution of the application. Obviously such heuristic based method
could lead to SDCs, which is another challenge problem in HPC community.
In contrast, CARE undertakes a proper recovery process with regards to the maligned
address computation by recomputing it as per the program semantics and through the use
of in-tainted values by synthesizing a very lightweight function. It develops careful corre-
spondence mechanism to co-relate the recovery handlers to the fault causing instruction at
runtime. While CARE shares the similar goal and design to RCV and LetGo in that they
all aim to help applications to survive failures by replacing the default signal handler with
their own one to provide recovery services, CARE’s approach is more accurate than others,
and will not introduce SDCs.
4.12 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present and evaluate CARE, a lightweight and compiler-assisted error-
recovery mechanism that allows processes to survive crashes caused by certain transient
faults, such that applications can continue their execution. Based on our experimental stud-
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ies, we identified SIGSEGV as a major symptom to soft failures, and CARE is designed
for repairing SIGSEGV errors. For each memory access instruction that involves complex
address computations, CARE first builds a recovery kernel by cloning its address compu-
tations. At runtime, it maps the fault causing instruction to a failure recovery handler which
recomputes the address and masks the fault. CARE exploits semi-redundancies introduced
by modern compiler optimization techniques, including strength reduction and loop un-
rolling, for resilience purposes. Coupled with two new code transformations, CARE lever-
ages these semi-redundancies to repair soft failures caused by faults in induction variables.
We evaluated CARE with four scientific workloads and the NPB benchmark suite. Dur-
ing their normal executions, CARE incurs almost zero runtime overhead and fixed 27MB
memory overheads, and it can recover averagely to 83% SIGSEGV faults within a few
milliseconds.
We also demonstrated the impact of CARE on parallel jobs at the scale of 3072 cores.
Due to the low-latency recovery mechanism of CARE, the parallel jobs can finish their
computations as normal with almost no delays, even if a crash-causing error occurred and
repaired by CARE during their executions. These results show that CARE can allow ap-
plications to survive some classes of transient failures with little or no overhead, which is
of particular benefit in HPC scenarios where the cost of application failure is high. CARE
could also improve MTBF and therefore could open a door towards research on relaxation





This chapter first summarizes this dissertation and highlights its contributions on the design
and implementation of light-weight resilience techniques against transient hardware faults
via the help from compiler techniques. It concludes the dissertation with a discussion on
research directions for future work.
5.1 Summary
Resilience is projected to be a critical challenge for HPC systems due to system scaling
trends in higher circuit density, smaller transistor size and near-threshold voltage (NTV)
operations. These technology trends would make the system more susceptible to transient
hardware faults caused by such things as high-energy particle strikes and heat flux. Tran-
sient hardware faults would either lead scientific applications to generate incorrect outputs
(SDCs), or crash the execution of an application (Soft Failures). SDC is harmful to scien-
tific discoveries, since it could lead to incorrect scientific insights; and the presence of soft
failures requires the application to recompute the lost computation before continuing the
execution, necessitate more frequent checkpoints than would otherwise be desirable, and
lead to significant system overheads. Considering the fact that, despite the increasing threat
from transient hardware faults, fault-free operations would remain the most common case.
Therefore, desirable solutions against transient hardware faults call for low (no) overhead
systems that do not compromise the performance under no-fault conditions. To this end,
my dissertation presents a compiler-assisted resilience framework to validate a given simu-
lation run to be free of SDCs and allows processes to survive soft failures instead of being
simply terminated and restarted. A summary of techniques proposed in the dissertation are
presented in below:
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1. It presented and evaluated LADR, a lightweight application-level approach to protect
applications from SDCs. LADR employs anomaly-based techniques for detecting
SDCs in state variables of scientific applications. It improves extant anomaly-based
techniques by focusing on minimizing runtime and memory overheads primarily
through exploiting correlation among state variables and data points. LADR is eval-
uated using application-level fault injection experiments. Results suggest that LADR
can protect application from influential SDCs with no more than 8% overheads. For
two of evaluated workloads, it only incurs around 2% overheads. LADR demon-
strates that it is unnecessary to apply anomaly detection techniques on all crucial
variables. Instead, a subset of crucial variables can be identified employing compile-
time data-flow analysis.
2. It introduced CARE, a lightweight and compiler-assisted error-recovery mechanism
that allows processes to survive certain soft failures, such that the applications can
continue their execution. To motivate the design of CARE, it enthusiastically studied
the manifestation of soft failures based on experimental fault injection experiments,
and identified SIGSEGV as a major symptom to soft failures. Thus, CARE is spe-
cially designed for repairing SIGSEGV errors. For each memory access instruction
from scientific applications, CARE first builds a recovery kernel by cloning its ad-
dress computations. At runtime, it maps the fault causing instruction to a failure
recovery handler which recomputes the address and masks the fault. We evaluated
CARE mainly with a set of scientific workloads. During their normal executions,
CARE incurs almost zero runtime overhead and fixed 27MB memory overheads,
and it can recover averagely to 83% SIGSEGV faults within a few milliseconds. We
also demonstrated the impact of CARE on parallel jobs at the scale of 3072 cores.
Due to the low-latency recovery mechanism of CARE, the parallel jobs can finish
their computations as normal with almost no delays, even if a crash-causing error
occurred and repaired by CARE during their executions. These results show that
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CARE can allow applications to survive some classes of transient failures with little
or no overhead, which is of particular benefit in HPC scenarios where the cost of
application failure is high. CARE could also improve MTBF and therefore could
open a door towards research on relaxation of the checkpoint frequency which could
have significant resource and performance implications.
3. It demonstrates a valid way of exploiting code optimization techniques, including
strength reduction and loop unrolling, for soft failure recoveries. During the com-
pilation of applications, these code optimization techniques would introduce equiv-
alent computation patterns and values (semi-redundancies) into the code, providing
opportunities which can be exploited for resilience purposes. It introduced two new
code transformations to explicitly expose these semi-redundancies to underlying re-
covery kernel builders. It demonstrated that, by taking advantages of these semi-
redundancies, the recovery rate for soft failures can be increased by up to 2.9×. To
the best of our knowledge, it is the first technique that explores side-effects of code
optimization techniques for resilience purposes.
5.2 Future Work
The techniques introduced in this dissertation opened the door of exploiting applications’
properties for lightweight resilience solutions against transient hardware faults. While the
evaluation results demonstrate that they achieved remarkable milestones, there are still
many open challenges. We propose 3 potential future research directions:
5.2.1 Quantifying Propagation Impacts and Error Bounds of SDCs
LADR introduced in chapter 3 reveals that the data-flow among state variables of scientific
applications implies the propagation path of SDCs, and this information can be used to
minimize the runtime overhead of existent data-anomaly-based SDC detection methods.
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Despite its efficiency, we believe addressing the following two questions would make this
approach more attractive to the community:
1. Quantify Propagation Impacts. The data-flow information exploited by LADR only
qualitatively depicts the fault propagation path of SDCs. Assuming a fault corrupted
a value in state variable a, and this fault will be propagated into state variable b
when b is updated using a. Will the impact of the SDC be amplified or diminished
during this propagation? An SDC is said to be amplified if the introduced error in b
is larger than the error in a (Here, an error is defined as (Vfaulty − Vnormal)/Vnormal),
otherwise, it is diminished. Intuitively, if b is selected as the sink variable to a,
we expect the SDC impact would be amplified from a to b to make sure the SDC is
detectable. Augmenting the data-flow graph with this type of information will help to
guide the selection of sink variables such that SDC is amplified along the propagation
paths, therefore improve/guarantee the fault coverage of SDC detection.
2. Quantify User-acceptable Error Bounds. Data-anomaly based detection methods tar-
gets on influential SDCs. However, it still lacks of quantitative definition of “in-
fluential impacts” in current framework. On the other hand, different applications
could have vary sensibility to SDCs. Therefore, it is necessary to accept user-defined
acceptable error bounds into current SDC detection framework.
5.2.2 Resilient Code Generation Techniques
In chapter 4, CARE was depicted as a soft failure recovery framework based on compiler
techniques. Meanwhile, it is also observed that the code optimization passes in modern
compiler could interact with the recovery rate of CARE in a complex way: some com-
piler passes, although may need extra code transformations, could bring opportunities for
resilience techniques; and some other may not. Although CARE has exploited benefits
of a limited set of code optimization techniques, including strength reduction and loop
unrolling, there still lacks of comprehensive studies of code optimization techniques for
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resilience purposes. In addition, researchers in [62] demonstrated that many code shapes in
modern scientific application could exhibit nature error resilience capability against tran-
sient hardware faults. Based on these two observations, an interesting question is how to
generate code to improve its resilience while maintaining its performance, given that al-
most all existent compiler passes are primary designed for improving code performance,
but not the resilience ability.
5.2.3 Recovery based on Idempotent Processing
Almost all existent SDC detection solutions are completely based on software-level ap-
proaches. While they have demonstrated their efficiency for SDC detection, due to the
design strategy, they also have a extremely long detection latency (except instruction du-
plication based approaches which will incur significant runtime overheads), which have
posed significant challenges for designing corresponding recovery methodologies. For ex-
ample, the detection latency for anomaly-based SDC detection methods, such as LADR, is
measured in several time-steps of simulations (or millions or even billions of instructions),
therefore, they all currently have to rely on the expensive checkpoint/restart mechanism for
recoveries. Thus, efficient resilience techniques demand low-latent fault detection methods.
On the other hand, Gaurang et al. [63, 64] presented a low-cost hardware detector for
transient hardware faults based on acoustic sensors. As compared to current software level
approaches, it has very low detection latency. This approach opened a way of exploiting
the cooperation between hardware and software for resilience approaches against transient
hardware faults. Qingrui et al. [65] exploited this hardware feature, and proposed a micro-
checkpoint method, such that processes will periodically save their architecture states and
upon a detection of transient fault by the hardware, the impacted process can be safely
rolled back to a checkpoint to repair the corrupted process status. As compared to existing
checkpoint techniques, micro-checkpoint only incur 5% ∼ 10% performance overheads.
However, the micro-checkpoint may be unnecessary in this scope, since applications
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can be safely divided into a set of idempotent regions [66]. An idempotent region is a
sequence of code that can be safely re-executed several times without changing the result.
Therefore, if a fault corrupted the computation inside a region, it is safe to repair the pro-
cess state by rolling back to the beginning of region. A big challenge for designing such
idempotent region based resilience approaches comes from the requirement of coordinating
the region size to the detection latency of the hardware detector. The idempotent regions
constructed by current algorithms [66, 67, 68] are too small to benefit from the current
hardware detector for transient hardware faults. Each idempotent region constructed by
these algorithms typically contains a few instructions operating on scalar variables, which
is could be shorter than the detection latency of the hardware detector. Therefore, if a
fault corrupted the computation is a region, it may be not detected until the process has
executed into other regions, which would be difficult to be repaired. Therefore, compiler
techniques for constructing relatively coarse-granularity (larger) idempotent regions would
be interesting and helpful for these kinds of approaches.
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